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The Single European Actt 
by Jules Lonbay* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dreams of supranationality in Western Europe have faded in the face of an 
inter-governmental reality. The dream lives on though, as an inter-governmen-
tal CommunityI and could not of itself provide sufficient political strength to 
achieve a true internal market. 2 This aim is a common minimum' accepted by 
all who wish the Community well, for at the heart of the Community system 
lies the goal of a true common market with all the accruing trade benefits.4 
Although a great deal has been achieved, there is still a long way to gO.5 It is 
t The author has retained the copyright of this article. 
• Lecturer in Law, University of Birmingham; Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the University 
of Indiana at Bloomington when the article was written. 
I Strictly speaking there are three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community, created 
by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, (Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (\951) reprinted in Treaties establishing the European Communities, No. 13 
(1975) [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]); the European Atomic Energy Community (Treaty instituting the 
European Coal and Steel Community, March 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 167 (\957) [hereinafter EAEC 
Treaty]); and the European Economic Community, created by the Treaties of Rome in 1957 (Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 
. [hereinafter EEC Treaty]). A single court and parliamentary assembly served all three communities 
from 1957 and in 1967 a Treaty established a single Council and a single Commission of the European 
Communities. For ease of reference I shall hereafter refer to the communities as the "Community". 
See Houben, The Merger of Executives of the European Communities, 3 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 37 (1965). 
2 Even though aspects of decision-making are intergovernmental in character, the output is legally 
capable of being enforced and having a supranational character. 
'This aim was recognized most recently at the following summit meetings: Brussels (1985), Fontai-
nebleu and Dublin (1984), and Copenhagen (1982). See Commission White Paper, Completing the Internal 
Market, 1984-1985 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 310 Final) 3 (1985) [hereinafter White Paper]. 
4 The benefits of a large, unified home market (approximately 320 million people), even greater in 
size than the United States, is considered essential if European manufacturers are to compete with 
those from Japan and the United States. See D. SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COMMON MARKET (4th 
ed. 1981) for an analysis of the economic advantages of customs unions. Basically, optimal resource 
allocation under a market mechanism provides the rationale for a common market. Id. 
5 For example, a customs union has already been established. Individuals can now also directly 
enforce their Community-granted rights in national courts. The Community has doubled its size and 
today comprises twelve nations. For an overview of the Community'S achievements to date, see COM-
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 20TH GENERAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN 
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clear that there is a great need for intra-community coordination, particularly 
in information science and other technological areas.6 Coordination in research 
and the establishment of common technical standards are necessary to allow 
true exploitation of the Community-wide market.' This and other new policy 
initiatives and their implementation depend critically on the institutional 
makeup of the European Community and its ability to cope with the political 
pressures inherent in deciding policy matters and in creating as a practical 
matter a new internal market.8 Moreover, the Community has ambitions beyond 
establishing a common market.9 A true common market coupled with common 
policies and economic policy convergence are written into the original Com-
munity treaties. This already necessarily implies a relatively high level of formal 
institutional coordination and political cohesion. Because the Single European 
ActIO (SEA) takes the Community beyond these objectives,ll some institutional 
adjustment is clearly needed. 
This Article briefly sets out the major problems facing the European Com-
munity in its internal development, and assesses whether the latest reform 
attempt, the SEA, achieves the changes necessary to overcome the difficulties. 
The Article summarizes both the positive and the negative aspects of the SEA 
and lays out the essential reforms that have taken place. concentrating on the 
efforts to establish a single European market. The first part elaborates the 
difficulties encountered in the institutional decision-making process and the 
effects these have on establishing a unified market. It then looks at how the 
current reforms came about and what they hope to achieve. The second part 
assesses the SEA's likely impact and effectiveness in achieving its aims. 
COMMUNITIES (1987) [hereinafter 20TH REPORT]. For a brief introduction to Community law, see 
P.R.S.F. MATHIJSEN. A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY LAW (4th ed. 1985) and R. PLENDER, A PRACTICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1980). 
6 See infra notes III and 259 and accompanying text where the need for a unified market in this 
field is further explained. See also note 262 and accompanying text for the Single European Act's 
treatment of research and development policy. 
7 Other areas of policy also need attention, including the reform of the Community's Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
8 Although it could be argued that the political strength provided by European summitry (nourished 
by economic and political interdependence and domestic politics) would be sufficient, the mechanisms 
already in place are insufficient for the implementation of any policies so agreed. It is also clear that 
even when a policy is agreed upon at a summit meeting the promises often remain unfulfilled; for 
example, the 1969 promise of an economic and monetary union by 1980. 
9 Traditionally, the notion of a common market means that all the factors of production (workers, 
entrepreneurs and capital) must freely move in addition to the free movement of goods, thus helping 
ensure optimal resource allocation. 
10 Single European Act, February 17, 1986,25 I.L.M. 503 (1986), reprinted in EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp. 
2/86) [hereinafter SEA]. 
11 These objectives may be met by, inter alia, providing the Community the legal competence to cope 
with the various areas of policy previously dealt with through only a marginal delegation of jurisdiction. 
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II. THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
A. The Decision-making Difficulties 
The founding fathers of the Community envisaged a "spill-over" effect: The 
more the economies of the member states became integrated, the more neces-
sary political and economic cooperation would become, which in turn would 
lead to an increasing deposit of political power with European institutions. 
Member states would seek common solutions as they realized that cooperation 
was essential to make the Community work for their mutual benefit.12 The 
increasing enmeshment and resulting common policies have occurred, but the 
concomitant strengthening of the Community institutions has not. The member 
states have managed to wrest decision-making power from the community 
executive and reduce the decision-making process to a species of inter-govern-
mental haggling. 13 
The decision-making process of the Community, as originally envisioned, 
required cooperation between the European Commission (representing the 
Community interest) and the Council of Ministers (representing the member 
state interest). Whilst the Commission proposed,14 the Council of Ministers 
disposed. This "balance" in practice never truly worked. The causes of the 
institutional ills of the Community are catalogued and well known. IS They 
mainly flow and ebb around the democracy deficit in the decision-making 
process. 16 The directly elected European Parliament (EP),17 originally graced 
with only a consultative role, had managed to claw additional powers within the 
decision-making process before the creation of the SEA. Its opinions IS must be 
awaited where they are required by the treaties. It may bring an action under 
12 This is also a neo-functionalist notion. See P. TAYLOR, THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 9 
(1983). 
" The Community has more recently been seen as a "regime" providing stability and thus oppor-
tunities for member states. See Hoffman, Reflections on the Nation-state in Western Europe Today, 21 J. 
COMM. MKT. STUD. 33ff (1982). The author argues here that integration theory and ideas of European 
supranationalism are unrealistic. This may be so, but clearly the "legal" side of European integration 
makes the Community more than a simple "regime". See Wallace, Europe as a Confederation: The 
Community and the Nation-State 21 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 57 (1982). See also Weiler, Community, Member 
States and European Integration: Is the Law Relevant?, 21 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 39 (1983). 
14 The Commission has the exclusive right of initiative. EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 155. 
15 Numerous reports catalogue them from Vedel in the early seventies to the Dooge report in 1985. 
Vedel Report, EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp. 4/72) (1972). Report on European Institutions (3 Wise Men) 
(1979). Ad hoc Committee for International Affairs (Dooge), 1985 Report to the European Council. 
16 This was recognized in the 1972 Vedel Report which suggested inter alia an increase in the powers 
of the European Parliament. 
17 Throughout the Treaties, most references to the European Assembly are replaced by references 
to the European Parliament. 
18 Roquettes Freres S.A. v. Council, 1980 Eur. Cclmm. Ct. J. Rep. 3333. 
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article 175,'9 and some of its acts have legal effects within the meaning of article 
173.20 It also has substantial budgetary powers21 including the ability to block 
adoption of the budget. Its budgetary powers have enabled it to put its foot in 
the door of the decision-making process via the conciliation procedure.22 The 
member states restrain this source of Community power by keeping a strong 
grip on the purse strings and by adopting supplementary budgets outside the 
parliamentary process. The EP is now consulted by the Commission21 in the 
early stages of draft proposals. However, its opinions, whilst they must be 
received, can be ignored. Thus the only democratic control is indirect24 through 
the responsibility of the ministers in the Council of Ministers to their national 
parliaments.25 
The resultant lack of political legitimization has weakened the power of 
initiative of the Commission26 and helped accelerate the rise of both COREPER27 
and more importantly the European Council. 2H The requirement of unanimous 
voting in the Council of Ministers in certain key provisions29 and the use of the 
political veto'lO in areas where a quaiified majority vote is called for has distorted 
'" European ParI. v. Council, I Common Mkt. L.R. 138 (1985). 
'" Parti Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. Eur. ParI., Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 14,317 (1986), and European 
Council v. Eur. ParI., 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 94 (1986). 
"This was brought about by reforms of the EEC Treaty in 1970 and 1975. Sff, e.g., Re the Adoption 
of the Budget: European Council v. Eur. ParI., 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 94 (1986). Sa also The Budgel 
Conciliation Ag,,.eement of 1982, reprinted in B. RUDDEN & D. WYATT, BASIC COMMUNITY LAWS 139 (2d 
ed. 1986) [hereinafter RUDDEN]. 
22 Forman, The Conciliation Procedure, 16 COMMON MKT. 1.. REV. 77 (1979).joinl DeriamlirJll 1975, in 
RUDDEN, supra note 21. at 131. 
2:l The Commission seeks inter alia some "democratic" legitimacy for its proposals. 
" The European Parliament has no formal powers over the Council of Ministers. On the role of 
U.K. and Danish Parliament, see Fraser of Tullybelton, Scrutin.v of Communitv Legislation ill Ihe U.K. 
Parliament in IN MEMORIAM J .B.D. MITCHELL (1983); Moller, Dani .. h E.C. Decisioll·Mahing; All l"sider's 
View, 21 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 245 (1985). 
2:, This indirect democratic control has exacerbated the use of the political veto by giving it some 
legitimacy; the ministers being the one "democratic link" in the decision-making chain. 
20 See EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 155. The Council of Ministers has also excessively used its 
rights under Article 152 of the EEC Treaty. . 
" The Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States (CORE PER) is provided fi)r 
in Article 4 of the Merger Treaty (Tr .. aty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of 
the European Communities, April 8, 1965, reprinted in Encyclopedia of European Community Law: 
European Community Treaties B8030 (1974) [hereinafter Merger Treaty]). It is in permanent session 
and undertakes through its Working Groups much of the negotiation on particular decisions. 
"See, e.g., White Paper, .. upm note 3. The initiative for this document came most clearly from the 
European Council. /d. at 3. See also Bulmer, The European Council's Fint Decade: Between Interdependence 
and Domestic Politics, 24 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 89 (1985). 
'" See EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 100. 
30 This is the Luxembourg Compromise, sometimes referred to as the Accords of Luxembourg. 
This "agreement to differ" was hammered out in 1966 and allows a member state to plead "vital 
interests" and thus block a decision by what amounts to a veto. It has been criticized in many of the 
reports cited above. See, for example, note 15 and accompanying text. See also Nicoll, The Luxembourg 
Compromise, 23 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 33 (1984). See infra note 169. 
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the Commission's role. 31 This in itself would not be an entirely negative factor 
if the necessary legislation were still forthcoming. However, the degeneration 
of the decision-making process to inter-governmental haggling32 and the resul-
tant lack of legislation necessary to coordinate laws sufficiently to assure a true 
common market are the crux of the problem. 
New policy and policy reforms need, as a prerequisite, a lessening of resort 
to consensus politics in the Council of Ministers. The rise of inter-governmen-
talism can also be attributed to the fact that as the Community adopts laws in 
any given area, the member state competence in that area withers, eventually 
to be replaced by Community competence. This phenomenon, sometimes re-
ferred to as preemption,33 has led to a reduction in the number of decisions 
agreed to by the Council of Ministers in the Community forum and to an 
increase in policy initiatives outside the Community forum. Such outside initia-
tives are more amenable to member state control, but only indirect democratic 
control.34 
Although there is minimal democratic control and the decisional power lies 
in the hands of the Council of Ministers, there is no shortage of new policy 
initiatives, though many decisions creating them have been taken outside the 
framework of the original treaties and at least some of them have had little or 
no juridical basis in the original treaties. For example, the Community, at the 
end of 1986, does have a European Monetary System, but it is not a creature 
31 The use of unanimity where a qualified majority is called for diminishes the Commission's bar-
gaining power with the Council of Ministers. This is so since if the Council of Ministers can achieve 
unanimity it can also amend Commission proposals. See Article 149( 1), of the EEC Treaty (as amended 
by the SEA). Moreover, the Commission has the power to alter its proposal at any time up until a 
decision is taken. 
32 This is best illustrated in recent years by the annual budget crisis, some issues of which have now 
been legally settled. See supra note 21. 
" See generally Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Preemption-Consent and Deregulation, 
in T. SANDALOW & E. STEIN, 2 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 548 (1982). The European Court of Justice 
ruled in Simmenthal: 
... [T]he relationship between ... directly applicable measures of the [Community] institu-
tions ... and the national law of the Member States ... [is to] ... preclude the valid adoption 
of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with 
Community provisions. 
Indeed any recognition that national legislative measures which encroach upon the field 
within which the Community exercises its legislative power ... had any legal effect would 
amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness of obligations undertaken uncondi-
tionally and irrevocably by Member States pursuant to the Treaty and would thus imperil the 
very foundations of Community law. 
1978 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 629, at 651-52. 
34 For a classic example of preemption the reader can look to the effects of the Community's 
establishment of a fishing policy. The difficulties in adopting decisions in this field are now largely 
political, with the member states haggling over quota sizes. For preemption in action, see Commission 
v. U.K., 1981 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 263; R. v. Tymen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 3079; R. v. Kirk, 
1984 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2689. 
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of the treaties, nor do all the member states adhere to all its elements.55 The 
Community does have a foreign policy coordination system, but it falls outside 
the original treaties. There is a European University Institute, but it too exists 
outside the treaties. Tugendhat considers that there is no harm in this type of 
European integration, which can be viewed as a series of concentric circles with 
the European Council at the epicenter. 56 The inner circle comprises Community 
integration; the next represents Community-related reforms (such as the Eu-
ropean Monetary System); and in the outer circles are placed the various joint 
ventures (e.g., the European airbus) and joint efforts, such as the European 
Space program, where not all the member states are parties. 57 
There are then numerous policies established but many of them have a 
tenuous legal basis in the treaties.58 The "harm" to the Community, with all due 
respect to the Tugendhat, is twofold. It lies in the diminishment of democratic 
control over the future development of European integration and in the weak-
ening of the position of the Commission of the European Community at the 
expense of the member states.59 The result is the multi-speed Europe. 
B. Problems in Establishing the Common Market 
One of the key areas where the lack of a policy40 or lack of political will to 
implement a policrl (as a result of the political difficulties described above) has 
had a deleterious effect is in the establishment of the Common Market.42 The 
creation of a common market is a major objective of the European Community 
and its importance is underlined by its recognition in Article 2 of the Treaty of 
55 See generally P. LUDLOW, THE MAKING OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM (1982). 
!16 C. TUGENDHAT, MAKING SENSE OF EUROPE (1986). 
57 Non-member states are also parties to joint efforts. 
58 Although the Treaty did not direcdy ordain a regional policy, an energy policy, an environmental 
policy, a research policy, or an educational policy, the European Communities are blessed with all of 
these, largely at the initiative not of the Commission but of the European Council, a body not 
recognized by the Treaties. See infra note 170 and accompanying text for the effects of the SEA on 
the European Council. 
59 This may also effect the individual direcdy, as well, since the legal output of the policy creation 
will often result in direct legal obligations on individuals (and governments). This effect will depend 
on whether the policy is brought within the Community legal order. 
40 For example, the lack of true transport policy causes difficulties and distortions in the Common 
Market. See European Parliament v. European Council, supra note 19. 
41 For example, the lack of common intellectual property rights causes difficulties and distortions in 
the Common Market. See Lonbay, The Free Movement of Goods and Intellectud Property Rights, 1983 
HOLDS. L. REv. 54. 
42 This notion is wider than that of an "internal market" and includes the four freedoms as well as 
common policies and actions to prevent distortion of competition. The idea of an internal market 
relates primarily to the four freedoms that were to have been achieved by 1970 under the original 
EEC Treaty. See the new Article 8A infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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Rome (Treaty).43 Part Two of the Treaty, headed "Foundations of the Com-
munity," has four titles. Title One is headed "Free Movement of Goods." It 
covers the establishment of the customs union and the elimination of quanti-
tative restrictions on trade. Title Two is entitled "Agriculture." Title Three 
covers the free movement of persons, services and capital, and Title Four covers 
transport. Part Three of the Treaty covers Community policies.44 The difficul-
ties experienced by the Community can be gauged by the success of these 
provisions. For example, hardly a voice is raised in defense of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and its distortion of the budget of the Communities.45 
The Council of Ministers was recently hauled before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) by an irate European Parliament for failing to fulfill its obligations 
under the Treaty in regard to the establishment of transport policy.46 That a 
revision of the treaties was considered necessary to implement the goal of an 
internal market speaks for itself. It is on Titles One and Three of Part One of 
the EEC Treaty that the following analysis will be based. 
The barriers to the establishment of an internal market for the movement of 
goods are physical,47 technical48 and fiscal. 49 Since the SEA is primarily aimed 
at breaking down the technical barriers50, this analysis will concentrate on them, 
but the physical and fiscal barriers will also be discussed. 
The progress in creating a single internal market has been due in large 
measure to the rulings handed down by the European Court of Justice.51 One 
43 Article 2 provides: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively 
approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expan-
sion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer realtions 
between the States belonging to it. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 2. 
44 Part Four deals with Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories and Part Five deals 
with the Institutions. 
45 The excessive agricultural surpluses are primarily caused by relatively high price support and 
technical advances made in the agricultural business. The resulting fiscal burden comprises the bulk 
of compulsory expenditure in the Community budget and reduces the amount available for non-
compulsory expenditure. The EP has a more decisive voice in the non-compulsory component of the 
Community budget. On the CAP, in general, see F. SNYDER, THE LAW OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL 
POLICY (1985). On the budget, see 20TH REPORT supra note 5. 
46 The Parliament essentially won this action, the Council being found in default. See European ParI. 
v. Eur. Council, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 138 (1985). 
47 Such barriers include customs formalities and inspections. See infra note 55 and accompanying 
text. 
48 Such barriers are caused by different national commercial rules. Rau, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
3961, provides a neat illustration of this type of barrier. In that case Belgian rules that prescribed a 
cubic shape for margarine hindered trade from states where alternative shapes were prescribed or 
used. This was held to be contrary to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty. 
49 See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
50 The new Article 100A is a prime provision of the SEA. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
51 In general, the decision-making process has been bogged down in political deadlock over technical 
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can divide the rulings of the ECJ into those that established the effective legal 
order that allowed individuals directly enforceable rights,52 and those that her-
alded progress in the substantive law on the free movement of goods.53 Damage 
to the case law established by the former category of rulings would have a much 
greater impact on the development and progress of the Community than dam-
age to the latter case law. One cannot lightly dismiss the impact of over 180 
harmonizing directives issued under Article 100 (in the area of technical har-
monization), but these have, in the main, tackled particular narrow technical 
barriers to trade, whereas the Court's case law has had a much greater and 
wider effect. Naturally, the ECl alone cannot establish the standards and reg-
ulatory structures necessary to create a true internal market.54 
1. Physical Barriers 
Physical barriers to intra-community trade comprise, in the main, problems 
relating to customs formalities. They are one of the most obvious reminders 
that the European market is not yet unified.55 Although the thrust of the 
Commission's legislative program in this field is to simplify and finally remove 
altogether customs formalities, the questions of national safeguard measures 
approved by the Community under Article 115 remains a significant obstacle 
to finally removing frontier controls. The Commission also recognizes the par-
ticular problems posed by the control of terrorism and the drug trade which 
matters, stricto sensu, do not fall within the Community competence, but consid-
ers that there are adequate alternatives to strict frontier controls.56 The removal 
of frontier controls has clear implications also as regards fiscal barriersY The 
Single Administrative Document (a new customs form)58 will come into use on 
January 1, 1988 and will replace over seventy forms currently in use, thus 
details. See Commission's Report on Implementation of the White Paper, 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 
No. 300 Final) (1986). 
52 This line of cases begins with the celebrated case, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlanse Tariefcommisie, 
1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. I. See generally Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect, 9 COMMON MKT. 
L. REV. 425 (1972) and Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect"': an Infant Disease, 8 EUR. L. REV. 155 
(1983). 
53 Among the most celebrated cases are Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
837; and Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649. See 
generally P. OLIVER, THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS (1982 and 1984 supp.) and L. GORMLEY, PROHIB-
ITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE EEC (1985). 
54 The Commission estimates that roughly three hundred further legislative provisions are necessary. 
See supra note 51 at page 4. 
55 White Paper, supra note 3, at 9. 
56 For example, France has imposed visa controls on all non-Community nationals on the grounds 
of preventing terrorism following a spate of bombings in Paris in the Autumn of 1986. 
57 See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
58 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 79) (1985) implemented by three regulations adopted on July 22, 
1986,29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 263) (1986). 
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greatly facilitating internal transit. Recently the Commission has proposed mea-
sures to increase the amount of duty-free diesel fuel a lorry may contain in its 
fuel tanks on crossing frontiers. 59 Numerous legislative initiatives are in hand 
to remove customs formalities and health checks from frontier posts to depar-
ture or destination locations.60 Additionally, customs administration is slowly 
being computerized under the Caddia program.61 The ECl has not taken a 
prominent role in removing physical barriers to trade. In 1979 the ECl held 
that frontier checks were permitted only where allowed under article 36, or for 
levying internal taxes, or for transit controls or statistical purposes: "These 
residuary controls must nevertheless be reduced as far as possible so that trade 
between member states can take place in conditions as close as possible to those 
prevalent on a domestic market."62 In the Denkavit Futtermittel case the ECl ruled 
that "the member states have a duty to cooperate with each other to facilitate 
and minimize frontier checks."63 
2. Technical Barriers 
Apart from the physical barriers to trade there are also technical barriers. 
These are obstructions to the establishment of a common market caused most 
notably by national rules governing environmental, health, and safety protection 
where diverse rules and practices in different member states form severe bar-
riers to intra-community trade. The creation of Community rules in these areas 
has been possible because the objectives of the original Treaty of Rome are 
drawn widely enough to accommodate much creativity within the system. In 
particular, Article 100 allows for the approximation of member states' provisions 
that "directly affect the establishment or functioning of the Common Market."64 
Article 235 provides another basis for action.65 Such legislation, however, must 
59 Charging duty on fuel in truck tanks at frontiers is a classic example of an unnecessary hindrance 
to Community trade. See 20TH REPORT, supra note 5, at 104. 
60Id. at 101. 
61 27 OJ. EVR. COMM. (No. C 112) (1984); 28 OJ. EVR. COMM. (No. L 96) (1985). 
62 Commission v. Italy, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3247. 
63 Firma Denkavit Futtermittel v. Minister fUr Ernahrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369. 
64 See, e.g., Commission v. Italy, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. IllS, 1122, for a favorable European 
Court of Justice decision on the scope of Article 100 powers in relation to environmental law. See 
generally Currall, Some Aspects of the Relation Between Articles 30-36 and Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, with 
a Closer Look at Optional Harmonisation, 4 Y.B.E.L. 169 (1984). 
65 Article 235 reads: 
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation 
of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not 
provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take appropriate measures. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 235. 
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be approved by a unanimous Council of Ministers, and herein lies a political 
problem of great dimensions.66 
The demolition of technical barriers to trade has not yet fully been achieved 
by Articles 30 through 36 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 30 prohibits all 
"quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having an equivalent 
effect. ... " This prohibition wa's broadly construed in the Dassonville case to 
cover "[a]ll trading rules67 enacted by member states which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade 
•.•• "68 Article 3669 does not reserve certain matters to member state 
jurisdiction70 but rather allows the member state to justify its actions on the 
grounds specified. It must use the least restrictive method possible to achieve 
the desired. objective. 71 A fundamental principle is that recourse to Article 36 
is no longer possible once the Community has ado~ted rules. 72 
Besides the narrow leeway granted by Article 36, member states are allowed 
to take "reasonable measures" to regulate trade "in the general interest." In the 
Cassis de Dijon73 decision the ECj declared: 
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from the 
disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of 
the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provi-
sions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy the 
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the security of 
financial supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer.74 
66 See supra text discussing institutional problems of the Community. 
67 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837, 852. 
68 The phrase "trading rules" (reglementation commerciale) includes both court injunctions and admin-
istrative practices. See Industrie Diensten Groep B.V. v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij B.V., 1982 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 707; Commission v. Ireland, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4005. 
69 Article 36 provides: 
. . . articles 30-34 shall not preclude prohibitions and restrictions on imports, exports or 
goods in transit justified on the grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; 
the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value; or the protection of industrial 
and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 36. 
70 Carlo Tedesci v. Denkavit Commerciale S.R.L., 1977 E. Comm. J. Rep. 1555. 
71 Ex parte de Peipjer, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 613. 
72 Denkavit Futtermittel, supra note 63. 
7S Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 649. This decision 
fundamentally changed the Commission's attitude to harmonization. It decided to emphasize to a 
greater degree the enforcement of Article 30 liberalization, and to pursue less technical harmonization. 
S .. 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C256/2) (1980). 
74 [d. at 662. 
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This 'Judicial" list is nonexhaustive but is only available to member states as a 
justification to nondiscriminatory rules. 75 Only "necessary" measures are al-
lowed. The assessment of necessity amounts to a "rule of reason." If the test is 
passed then the measure is permissible under Community law. All other mea-
sures equivalent to quantitative restrictions to intra-community trade must be 
justified under Article 36. 
The ECl's case law, then, does not cover internal (i.e., national) general trade 
rules necessary to protect public health or the environment in the general 
interest. It establishes a "rule of recognition." Member states are required by 
the rule to recognize each others' technical requirements as equivalent.76 This 
rule, though, is tempered where health or safety are involved. Thus in an 
Article 169 action77 against France'S for refusal to allow German woodworking 
tools to be used in France, the Commission's complaint was dismissed. The ECl 
considered that the Commission had not shown that the German rules con-
cerning protective devices for woodworking machines guaranteed to users the 
same level of protection as the French rules on that subject. There is clearly a 
high level of proof required even in direct actions. 
It is also evident from recent cases that the ECl is giving the member states 
considerable leeway if they plead "scientific uncertainty" in relation to public 
health matters. 79 There is no requirement to accept each others' health-related 
tests. SO The apparent redundancy caused by the fact that "public health" was 
enumerated in the Cassis de D~'on list of "mandatory requirements" that may 
justify a member states' nondiscriminatory (equally applicable) commercial mea-
sures (under Article 30),BI when it already exists as an available justification for 
measures that hinder trade under Article 36, may perhaps be explained by the 
fact that Article 30 is not as broad as the "integrationist" writersB2 believe. 
Moreover it seems that, at least in the field of health and price control, Article 
75 See Commission v. Ireland, 198 I E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1625. 
76 See, e.g., Robertson, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2349. 
77 This article allows the Commission to bring member states before the Court of Justice for violations 
of the EEC Treaty. See generally H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
244 (3d ed. 1983). See also H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, 5 THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
377 (1986) [hereinafter SMIT & HERZOG]. 
78 Commission v. France, No. 188/84 (Jan. 28, 1986). 
79 See, e.g., Officier van Justitie v. A. Heijn B.V., 1984 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 3263 and Commission 
v. Italy, No. 35/84 (Feb. 18, 1986), where the Commission complaint concerning Italy's treatment of 
imports of curd cheese was rejected by the Court for lack of evidence and a failure to rebut the Italian 
defense. See also Officier van J ustitie v. Koninklijke Kaasfabriek Eyssen B. V., 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep.409. 
80 See Commission v. France, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 933; C.M.C. Melkunie B.V., 1984 E. Comm. 
Cl.]. Rep. 2367. 
81 The "rule of reason" test allows member states to take "necessary" action in the "general interests" 
if "mandatory requirements" compel it to do so. 
82 See, e.g., Gormley and Oliver, supra note 53. 
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30 does allow member states discretion to adopt national commercial rules unless 
actual "discrimination" is shown.83 
A recent illustration of this in the field of price control is shown in Nederlandse 
Bakkerij Stichting v. Edah B. V. 84 The action in these two cases arose from pro-
ceedings taken in the Netherlands against Edah B.V. for selling Dutch-made 
bread at a price lower than the minimum selling price fixed by Dutch law. Edah 
justified its action by relying on Articles 785 and 30 of the EEC Treaty. As the 
Dutch rules differentiated between Dutch-made bread and imported bread, the 
government was not able to rely on the Cassis de Dijon mandatory requirements 
exceptions, but was the Dutch price maintenance system itself in violation of 
Article 30? The ECJ held that the legislation would be contrary to Article 30 if 
it was likely to affect adversely, in any manner whatsoever, the sale of imported 
products.86 If, however, it had no discriminatory effect, then it would not be 
contrary to Article 30.87 The court thus clearly required a discriminatory effect 
before considering a national rule to be contrary to Article 30. It would have 
perhaps been clearer if the ECJ, instead of ruling that the scope of Article 30 
depended on the effects that the national regulation had on intra-community 
trade, had stuck with its initial finding that because of the differential treatment 
meted out to imports and domestic products, the Dutch rules were ipso facto 
measures equivalent to a quantitative restriction. The ECl could then have gone 
on to advise the national court about the application of Article 36.88 It is clear 
from the case that Article 30, in the case of price control measures, requires a 
discriminatory effect before it comes into play; it does not cover all trading 
rules that potentially affect trade. 
83 Article 34 case law also contains this requirement. See generally Marenko, Pour une Interpretation 
Traditionnelle de la Notion de Mesure d'Effet Equivalent Ii une Restriction Quantitative, 1985 CAHIERS DE 
DROIT EUROPEAN 291. See also Galmot & Biancarelli, Les Reglementations Nationales en Matiere de Prix au 
Regard du Droit Communautaire, 21 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEAN 269, 290-91 (1985). 
Galmot and Biancarelli speculate on the rationale for extending the scope of member state action 
from the clutches of the wide Dassonville formula in order to justify the Court's disallowance of pleas 
based on the mandatory requirements grounds of Cullet, 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 305 and Leclerc, 
1985 E. Comm. C. J. Rep. I (1985). 
84 Nederlandse Bakkerij Stichting and Others v. Edah BV, No. 80 & 159/85 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
85 This article prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality. 
86 The pertinent part of the holding reads: " ... une telle reglementation differencie pour les deux 
groupes de produits doit etre consideree comme mesure d'effet equivalent a une restriction quantitative 
des qU'elle est susceptible de defavoriser, de quelque fa~on que ce soit, l'ecoulement des produits 
importes." No. 80 & 159/85 (Nov. 13, 1986). 
87 The cases conveniently provided a fact situation that allowed the Court to specifically deal with 
this issue since the Dutch had reformed the price control system so that in the second of the joined 
cases no price discrimination was in fact possible. 
88 The Court in an Article 177 action cannot rule on the validity or otherwise of national measures. 
What it seeks to do is furnish the national court with an interpretation of Community law that will 
help the national court decide the case before it. One gets the impression that this task sometimes 
overrides requirements of theoretical consistency. 
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This argument is contradicted by Gormley,89 who prefers to consider that 
Article 30 does in fact cover all trade rules,90 and that the exceptional cases 
such as Blesgen91 and the price control cases,92 are explained by saying that the 
ECl adopted a U.S. approach93 to noncommercially motivated trading rules. 
The utility of adopting the U.S. approach, however, is not readily apparent. 
The very wide integrationist approach of the ECl, it is argued, allows for 
member state action as an equitable principle until the Community adopts 
harmonized rules. It seems, however, that the real motive for limiting the 
application of Article 30 for such nontrading reasons lies in that fact that the 
ECl, is unwilling to assess a state's noneconomic motives, especially those that 
relate to health and safety, the more so where there is some scientific uncer-
tainty.94 When the action arises under Article 177,95 it is not the ECl's job in 
any event, and the court is really in no position to assess the efficacy of various 
scientific tests. When the matter is brought to the ECl by the Commission under 
a direct Article 169 action, the court has required a high standard of proof 
from the Commission,96 although blatantly protectionist measures have been 
struck down.97 The variable scope given to Article 30 in the case law, unsatis-
factorily resolved by conflicting theoretical approaches, is probably due to "un-
known" conflicts in the court itself as to the extent of its reach.98 
89 See GORMLEY. supra note 53. at 251. 
90 See also OLIVER. supra note 53. 
91 Blesgen v. Belgium, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. j. Rep. 1211. This case involved the Belgian law that 
regulated the distribution of alcoholic beverages. The Belgians successfully argued that these nondis-
criminatory regulations were necessary to protect public health. The ECj did not decide the issue on 
those grounds however. Instead it found that the Belgian rules were of such a nature as to have no 
effect on intra-community trade. This decision flew in the face of its previous case law as the Court 
provided no Cassis de Dijon analysis of the necessity of the Belgian rules. It was clear, prima facie, that 
they did "effect trade between merpber states." The case is considered an aberration, but one expla-
nation for the ruling may be that the Court did not wish to get involved in an analysis of the Belgian 
methods of combatting alcoholism. The ECj itself played up the fact that only certain outlets were 
forbidden and others (including supermarkets) were free to distribute the higher alcohol content 
drinks. The Commission had prepared a detailed study of all the different methods that the member 
states used to the same end, but having asked for this information the Court declined to use it overtly 
in its judgment. The explanation that the ECJ was introducing a de minimis rule here was scotched by 
Van der Haar, E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1797 (1984). 
92 Roussel v. Netherlands, E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 483 (1983). 
93 GORMLEY, supra note 53, at 55-56 and 252. The author argues that the Blesgen decision follows 
the American tradition of distinguishing between the "police powers" of the states and the "commercial 
regulation" of states; the former being permissible, the latter not. 
94 See cases cited in notes 79 and 80. See generally GORMLEY. supra note 53, at 166. 
95 Article 177 of the EEC Treaty is at the heart of the Community legal order. See EEC Treaty, 
supra note I, at art. 177. See generally H. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITIES, 350 (3d ed. 1983). See also Harding, The Impact o[ Article 177 o[ the EEC Treaty on the Review 
o[Community Action, I Y.B.E.L. 93 (1983). See also 5 SMIT & HERZOG, supra note 77, at 443. 
96 Commission v. France, 19852 Common Mkt. L.R. 185 (1985). 
97 Commission v. U. K., 1982 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2793. 
9B The recent case, Cinetheque, I Common Mkt. L.R. 365 (1986). which applied the "pure" Cassis de 
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A descriptive approach adopted from the ECl's case law dealing with the 
question of intellectual property rights aptly summarizes the current situation. 
The member states retain the right to regulate commercial activities, but the 
exercise of the right will be overseen. Community law will not permit the fun-
damental principle of free movement of goods to be jeopardized by member 
state regulation. Yet it must allow such regulation, for otherwise there would 
be very little protection of vital interests of the European citizen.99 This comes 
close to what Waelbroeck 100 has termed "pragmatic preemption" where the 
member states are permitted to act unless in doing so they defy the aims of the 
Community policy. 
Member state competence withers where the Community has adopted mea-
sures. IOI However, many Community measures set up a minimum standard, 
and allow the member states to establish higher standards on grounds inter alia 
of public health. 102 The ECJ generally allows the member state the benefit of 
the doubt in cases of a disputed national rule. Moreover, even where one might 
think the Community rules are fairly comprehensive, the ECl has found certain 
member state actions to be allowable. lOS In the recent Motte caselO4 the Belgian 
rules on permissible colorants required authorization before the additive could 
be imported. The court held that such a system was compatible with the Treaty 
as long as the authorization was granted when the substance corresponded to 
a "real need" for consumers. In assessing the health risk posed by food additives 
the member states had to take into account the results of international scientific 
research. This, it seems, is the extent of the member states' duty to cooperate. 105 
The court in Motte allowed a prior restriction (requirement of authorization) 
Dijon rule to a situation where a more limited concept of article 30 was possible (and suggested by the 
Advocate General) has been considered by both Oliver and Gormley to vindicate the wide integrationist 
approach. See Oliver, A Review of the Case Law of the Court of Justice on Articles 30 to 36 EEC in 1985, 
23 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 325 at 344; Gormley, Quantitative Restrictions and Measures Having Equivalent 
Effect, -Eur. L. Rev. 431, 440 (1985). The case, however, did not involve issues relating to human 
health, safety or the environment, and it is in these areas where the Court has consistently shown 
great deference to member states. 
99 The communities' inability to legislate effectively in this area may be seen as desirable by govern-
ments keen on deregulation for ideological economic reasons. 
100 See supra note 33. 
101 This principle has formed part of the jurisfrr1N1ence constante for a considerable time. See, e.g., 
Cassis de Dijon, supra note 73. 
10. See, e.g., 7 ].0. COMM. EUR. (Directive No. 64/54) 99 (Sp. ed. 1963-64); Sandoz, 1983 E. Comm. 
Ct.]. Rep. 2445, recital 13 et seq.; and Ministere Public v. Kugelmann, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 433. 
lOS See, e.g., Campus Oil, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 465 (1984). To the Commission's surprise, the 
Community'S rules on oil storage drawn up after the oil shocks of the 1970s were held by the Court 
not to deprive Ireland of the right to regulate in this field (by requiring a percentage of Irish refinery 
use by all those importing oil to Ireland) as they did not "unconditionally guarantee" petroleum 
supplies. The Irish "public security" argument prevailed. 
104 Leon Motte, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 663 (1987). 
105 This duty was first established in the Denkavit Futtermittel case, supra note 63. 
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on trade between member states. This latitude, to what amounts to a licensing 
system, is in stark contrast with its earlier rulings relating to licenses in general,106 
and is explained by the subject matter of the Motte dispute. 107 
Harmonization of these areas using Article 100 has proved extremely SIOW,IOB 
and Article 100 is not available for all the measures that are necessary to ensure 
a true common market. 109 Recently the Council and Commission have adopted 
a new twofold approach 110 to harmonization of technical standards. I I I They 
acknowledged that mutual recognition of different national standards was not 
enough. They urged the creation of a genuine trading market, a true continental 
market with pan-European companies and cooperation, especially in the new 
technologies. As regards health and safety standards, they proposed to use 
minimum Community-wide standards. Thus mutual recognition, an ECJ-led 
move, was considered a transitional and secondary stage only. 
Under directive 831189,1l2 in force since January 1, 1985, member states must 
inform the Commission before they introduce new technical standards or reg-
ulations, and must offer an explanation justifying them. ll3 If the Commission 
or another member state objects to a regulation on the grounds that it would 
create a barrier to free movement of goods, the member state must delay its 
implementation. 1l4 Clearly this legislation is a major step forward and the Com-
mission recognizes as much in its First Report on the White Paper. II5 Moreover, 
the directive establishes a standing committee of member state representatives, 
which must meet at least twice a year. II6 The representatives may in turn appoint 
106 Procureur du Roi v. Bouhelier, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 192. 
107 See also Minister Public v. Xavier Mirepoix, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 44 (1987). 
108 Harmonization is also very cumbersome since it is difficult to enforce implementation of the 
directives adopted. This occurs largely because of a lack of sufficient manpower. For example, en-
forcement of the EC fishing quotas relies upon six inspectors for the entire Community. Elaborating 
technical rules is further complicated by the difficulty in upgrading adopted standards in the light of 
scientific ad vances. 
109 The European Community has had to design a new European Patent Convention to cope with 
the barriers to trade caused by intellectual property rights. See Lonbay, The Free Movement of Goods and 
Intellectual Property Rights, 1983 HOLDS. L. REV. 54. The proposed trade mark regulation could not be 
made using Article 100 because Article 100 only allows the approximation of matters already regulated 
at the state level. Further, the use of Article 235 has been challenged. See CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 581 (1981). See aLm Currall, supra note 64. 
110 White Paper, supra note 3, heralded the move from harmonization (which requires unanimity 
under Article 100) and mutual recognition of equivalence of different national standards to the new 
approach. See also First Report from the Commission on Completing the Internal Market, 1986--1987 EUR. 
PARL. Doc. (COM No. 300 final)(1986) [hereinafter First ReportJ. 
III Council Resolution of May 7,1985. lEuR. COMM. BULL. II (1985). 
112 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 109/8)(1983). 
113 In the case of regulations. See Article 8 of Dir. 83/189. 
114 See Article 9 of Dir. 83/189. Emergency health or safety reasons may justify a member state 
introducing regulations without notice. 
115 See supra note 110. 
116 See Articles 5 and 6 of Dir. 83/189. 
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experts or advisors. The value of such an institutionalized forum for exchange 
of views cannot be overstated, and it seems to have stemmed the tide of "pro-
tectionist" or "obfuscating" national standards and regulations. ll7 
Under the second element of the new policy, health and safety standards" 8 
will be harmonized to a basic "essential" European level by directive. Manufac-
turers relying on this standard will have guaranteed access to the entire Euro-
pean market. The standard would not be compulsory, but manufacturers not 
using it would have the burden of proving that their product meets the "essential 
requirements" standard in the directive. llg The detailed implementation of the 
technical standard is to be left to standards committees such as the European 
Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Elec-
trotechnical Standardisation (Cenelec). Examples of the new approach that also 
reflect the results of the SEA reforms are the recent Commission proposals on 
foodstuffs. The member state powers of derogation have been removed by the 
new proposals. 120 
3. Fiscal Barriers 
The fiscal barriers to internal Community trade l21 are indirect barriers to free 
movement of goods. They revolve around the differential rates of indirect 
taxation in the member states and the collection of such tax at the frontiers. It 
is the latter fact that causes the Commission to distinguish them from other 
indirect barriers to trade such as distortion of trade caused by abuse of a 
dominant market position.1 22 The Community currently applies the destination 
principle of taxation, thus necessitating frontier formalities for the collection 
and remission of tax on goods. The advantage of this system lies in the fact 
that there is no tax distortion of the destination market and each country pays 
its own taxes. An alternative method of dealing with the problem of tax burdens 
in international trade is to adopt the origin method. This has the advantage of 
117 First Report, supra note 110, at 13. Thirty two draft national regulations were suspended under 
these provisions in 1985, and as a result of this suspension, the Commission proposed ten Community 
directives designed to replace the national provisions. The Commission states: "The policy of pre-
venting potential barriers from being set up has already had an impact on the number and type of 
complaints received by the Commission." 
118 White Paper, supra note 3, at 21. 
119 5 EUR. COMM. BULL. 10 (1985); 3 EUR. COMM. BULL. 18 (1986). 
120 See 1984-1985 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 603) (1985). But see infra note 225 and accompanying 
text. 
121 See generally A. EASSON, TAX LAW AND POLICY IN THE EEC (1980). 
122 See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 85 & 86. See generally WHISH, COMPETITION LAW (1986). 
These articles are not concerned with such indirect effects on the functioning of the common market 
as anti-competitive behavior, state subsidies to industry or state monopolies. The rules in these areas 
are not affected by the passing of the SEA. 
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eliminating the need for customs formalities, but causes tax distortion of the 
markets unless there is harmonization of tax types, bases, and rates. 
As in other areas, the progress of the decision-makers has been fairly slow, 
but this is perhaps more understandable in the sensitive area of tax harmoni-
zation. The Treaty provides in Articles 95 and 96 some directly effective pro-
visions. '23 Article 95 is designed to prevent member states from discriminating 
against the products of other member states in their tax rules. The ECl has 
interpreted this article broadly and inventively. While the essential equation of 
Article 95 124 requires a balance between the levels of indirect taxation 125 imposed 
on domestic goods and on similar imported goods,'26 the court has managed to 
restore an element of traditional state sovereignty in this field by allowing 
member states to adopt differential schemes '27 of taxation for similar products 
provided they have justifiable and objective socioeconomic rationales to support 
such differentiation and provided that the effect of the tax is nondiscriminatory 
(has no protective effects) as regards imports. This line of case law enables the 
ECl to inspect member states' socioeconomic tax related objectives to ensure 
123 Lutticke v. H.Z.A. Saarlouis, _Common Mkt. L.R. 674. 
124 Article 95 states: 
No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member 
States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on 
similar domestic products. 
Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any 
internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 95. 
125 See Molkerie-Zentrale v. HZA Paderborn, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 143; Schottle, 1977 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 247; HZA Flensburg v. H.C. Andresen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2835; and 
Pabst and Richarz K.G. v. HZA Oldenburg, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1331 for the definition of 
taxation in this context. 
126 In Finct Frucht, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, the Court considered that: 
Similarity between products within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 95 exists 
when the products in question are normally to be considered as coming within the same fiscal, 
customs or statistical classification, as the case may be. 
In Rewe, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, involving the German Spirits monopoly, the ECJ had to 
consider what was meant by the phrase "similar products." The implementation of Article 95 implies 
the application of criteria by which the presence or absence of such similarity may be judged. If 
products have "similar characteristics and meet the same needs (e.g. raw materials) from the point of view 
of consumers ... then they might be considered as similar from the point of view of Article 95. The 
products must have comparable uses . .. they needn't be identical." (Emphasis added). In Rewe, the 
Court elaborated that the products should be compared at a similar stage of production. The second 
sentence of Article 95 covers indirect protection of other non-similar products. This has lead to a 
complex case law, a good example being Commission v. U.K., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 417. That 
case was litigated for seven years and required three Advocate General Opinions as well as several 
judgments to decide whether the British tax regime offered indirect protection to British beer as 
opposed to continental wine. 
127 Bobie Getrankervertrieb v. H.Z.A. Aachen-Nord, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1079; Hansen Jun 
and Balle GmbH v. H.Z.A. Flensburg, I Common Mkt. L.R. 604 (1979); Hansen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. 
J. Rep. 1165; Commission v. Italy, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. I; Vinal v. Orbat; Chemial Farmaceutici 
v. OAF, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. I; Commission v. Italy, E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 601 (1983); Humblot 
v. D.G. des Services Fiscaux, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1367 (1985). 
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that they are in conformity with the spirit of the Treaty and have no deleterious 
trade effects. '28 
The ECl has also managed to extend the scope of Articles 95 and 96 to cover 
not only export subsidies l29 but also taxes on exports that exceed the level 
imposed on goods sold on the domestic market. uo Although the court has been 
adventurous in this field, it cannot deal with the establishment of common tax 
rates nor cause the fiscal frontiers to vanish. 131 
Article 99 allows the Commission to consider how indirect taxation can be 
harmonized "in the interest of the common market."132 Its proposals can fall 
under either Article 1 00 or Article 10 1.133 Tax harmonization is underway'34 
with over twenty value-added tax (VAT) directives having been proposed by 
the Commission. The fiscal frontier problem is potentially dealt with by the 
fourteenth VAT directive '35 which essentially provides for an accounting shift 
to allow internal tax offices to cope with the tax collection. Interstate transfers 
would be dealt with by the institution of a new computer based clearinghouse. u6 
128 A side effect of the application of differential tax rates is that the member state's socio-economic 
policies are exported by encouraging all EC firms exporting to that country to gain the tax advantages 
so offered, thus causing tax distortion of the market. This is ironic result considering that the aim of 
Articles 95 and 96 has been to guarantee the neutrality of systems of internal taxation with regard to 
intra-community trade. Statens Control med Aedle Metaller v. Larsen, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
1543. 
129 This extension may be expected since Article 96 provides: 
Where products are exported to the territory of any Member State, any repayment of internal 
taxation shall not exceed the internal taxation imposed on them, whether directly or indirectly. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 96. 
130 Van der Hulst Zonen, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 79. In both Larsen and Kjevulff, the Court, in 
recital 24, stated that in light of the fact that in some circumstances a member state may wish to inhibit 
exports, the aims of Article 95-96 were tax neutrality. 
'" The ECJ did rule that 
It must be remembered that the purpose of creating a common market in which goods move 
freely in undistorted conditions of competition in accordance with articles 2 and 3 of the 
Treaty is to eliminate such entrenchment of habits of consumption by ensuring that all 
consumers have as far as possible equal access to all community products. 
Commission v. Italy, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 531 (1983). 
132 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 99 
'" These rarely used articles allow the Council to adopt measures designed to overcome distortion 
of competitive conditions in the common market through qualified majority voting. See EEC Treaty, 
supra note I, at arts. 100 & 101. 
134 It has the added advantage that currently Community "own resources" are based on a fixed 
percentage of VAT receipts. The member states collect the tax and pass over 1.4 percent, retaining 
10 percent of the sum collected to cover their costs. This source of own resources has the disadvantage 
that the fixed percentage rate is kept low by the member states who can restrain the burgeoning 
expenditures of the European Communities. Raising this tax threshhold requires member state un-
animity. In these circumstances, it is not surprising to see the Commission now proposing an alternative 
source of EEC financing based on a percentage of GDP. 
135 This has yet to be adopted. 1982 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 402) (1982). 
136 Cnossen, Harmonization of Indirect Taxes in the EEC, BRIT. TAX REv. 232 (1983). 
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The Commission White Paper plans for indirect tax approximation 137 of bases, 
rates, and level of rates primarily to cope with the problems of fraud and 
evasion that the solution to frontier collection would open Up.138 The ECl has 
not been entirely silent on VAT harmonization: "The requirements of Article 
95 are of a mandatory nature and do not allow any derogation by a measure 
adopted by an institution of the Community .... "139 Using its teleological meth-
ods of interpretation based on articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty and its objective 
of achieving a single market, the ECl made it clear that the Community market 
should be as close as possible to a "genuine internal market."140 "It is important 
that not only commerce but also private persons who happen to be conducting 
an economic transaction across national frontiers should be able to enjoy the 
benefits of the Common Market."141 
The ECl proceeded, in effect, to rewrite a section of the sixth VAT directive 
that allowed private persons to be taxed on import even though tax had not 
been remitted on export: 
It may be observed that at the present stage of Community Law the 
member states are free, by virtue of Article 95, to charge the same 
amount on importation of products as the VAT which they charge 
on similar domestic products. Nevertheless, this compensation is 
justified only insofar as the imported products are not already bur-
dened with VAT in the member state of exportation since otherwise 
the tax on importation would in fact be an additional charge bur-
dening imported products more heavily than similar domestic prod-
uctS.142 
The importer would have to prove the amount of tax paid. 143 The EC l, it seems, 
was urging the legislature on, and the Commission, in enacting the SEA, lost 
no time in adopting the court's new position.I'4 Whether the SEA signals ad-
vances in the area of tax harmonization will be analyzed in part two. 
137 White Paper, supra note 3, at 47. 
138 The same logic applies to excise taxes which the Commission also proposes to approximate. 
139 Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur B. V. v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Roosendaal, 




143 Gaston Schul, 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 559 (1986). The Secretary of State for Finance appealed the 
ruling of the lower court in response to the ECl's judgment in the first Gaston Schul case. The EC], in 
a very specific ruling, held that the VAT already paid and remaining in the value of the article must 
not be included in the taxable amount. It then gave a formula for working out the VAT owed. This 
is a case of judicial creativity on a high scale. 
144 See 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 3/2)(1986), a~ amended by 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 28)(1986). 
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4. Services and Establishment 
It is essential for a common market that the transfrontier services be unhin-
dered, and a right of establishment145 for businesses (including the liberal 
professions)146 in other member states be effected. As in the field of free move-
ment of goods, there was initially some debate as to whether the Treaty required, 
in Article 59, the mere elimination of discriminatory measures aimed at 
nonnationals l47 or more widely the removal of all "restrictions" on the provision 
of services by those not established in the state where the service was being 
provided. Did the foreigner have to comply with nondiscriminatory national 
restrictions imposed equally on all providing the service?148 
The ECjI49 has applied a rule of reason to this question, similar to that found 
in its article 30 jurisprudence. The least restrictive (proportionate) nondiscri-
minatory measures applied in the general interest l50 are permitted provided 
that the general interest so protected is not already covered by analogous 
measures in the provider's state (principle of equivalence). The recent insurance 
cases confirmed this approach: 
The freedom to provide services, as one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Treaty, may be restricted only by provisions which are 
justified by the general good and which are applied to all persons 
or undertakings operating within the territory of the State in which 
the service is provided in so far as that interest is not safeguarded 
by the provisions to which the provider of a service is subject in the 
Member State of his establishment. In addition, such requirements 
145 See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 52. 
146 Regarding lawyers, see Ordre des Avocats au Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 2971. See generally Brunois, Apres ['Arret Klopp itat des prestations de services et des etablissements des 
avocats en Europe. 21 R.T.D.E. 65 (1985). 
147 Ministere Public v. van Wesemael. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 35. largely resolved this. See 
Forwood & Clough. The Single European Act and Free Movement. 11 EUR. L. REV. 383. 388 (1986). 
Restrictions on the grounds of nationality or reciprocity requirements have long been recognized as 
contrary to Community law. See Commission v. Italy. 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. _. (No. 168/85. Oct. 
16.1986). 
14. Articles 55 and 56 of the Treaty (via Article 66) and Article 61 provide exceptions to the right 
to provide services and the right to establishment. 
149 Its early rulings in Reyners v. Belgium. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 631. and Van Binsbergen v. 
Van de Bedrijfsvereniging. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1299. were groundbreaking in establishing 
direct effect of Article 52. the first paragraph of Article 59. and third paragraph of Article 60. 
150 See. inter alia. measures to regulate television advertising in Procureur du Roi v. Debauve. 1980 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 833. and Commission v. Germany. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 69 (1987). where the 
EC] stated that national regulatory measures in the insurance services sector might be 
compatible with Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty only if it is established that in the field 
of activity concerned there are imperative reasons relating to the public interest which justify 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services. that the public interest is not already protected 
by the rules of the State of establishment and that the same result cannot be obtained by less 
restrictive rules. 
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must be objectively justified by the need to ensure that professional 
rules of conduct are complied with and that the interests which such 
rules are designed to safeguard are protected. 15l 
51 
The court found that in the absence of Community measures, Germany was 
justified in requiring that insurance companies comply with its rules on technical 
reserves l52 as long as these were not excessive. Authorization was only permis-
sible if it did not duplicate equivalent statutory conditions that the company 
had already complied with in its state of establishment. The German require-
ment that insurance companies must establish in Germany was considered by 
the court to be the very negation of the freedom to provide services and thus 
contrary to Community law. 
The Commission has used the idea of mutual recognition in the sphere of 
free movement of services and right of establishment. In particular require-
ments for national diplomas, certificates, and degrees have hampered free 
movement in these fields. Modest liberalization has been achieved in, inter alia, 
the medical,153 legal,154 architectural,155 and insurance l56 sectors. The Commu-
nity is pressing ahead with plans for a general recognition of higher education 
diplomas for vocational courses. 157 
5. Capital 
The right of establishmentl58 also requires liberalization of capital movements, 
a link recognized by the ECl in the Casali case. 159 Similarly, the other rights of 
free movement would be rendered nugatory should "means of payment" 160 and 
lSI See, e.g., Commission v. Germany, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 69 (1987). Here, German rules requiring 
that direct insurance providers be established and authorized in Germany and forbidding insurance 
brokers in Germany from placing insurance with other Community insurers were challenged by the 
Commission. See Chappatte, Freedom to Provide Insurance Services in the European Community, 9 EUR. L. 
REV. 3 (1984) for the situation prior to these cases. 
152 Reserves designed to meet potential contractual liabilities. 
153 See, e.g., midwives, 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 33)(1980); nurses, 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 
176)(1977); dentists, 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 233)(1978); veterinary surgeons, 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 363)(1978); Advisory Committees on training for doctors, 18 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 
167)(1975); nurses 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26)(1977); general (except lawyers), 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 78)(1977); and pharmacists 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 253)(1985). 
154 20 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 78)(1977). 
155 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 223)(1985); 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 376)(1985). 
156 Chappatte, supra note 151. 
157 Proposed Directive, 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 257 final) (1986). 
158 The second sentence of Article 52 of the EEC Treaty subordinates the right of establishment to 
the prior liberalization of capital. 
159Casati, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 2595. 
160 The Court has distinguished "means of payment" (current payment) from "capital." Means of 
payment is guaranteed as essential to the creation of a common market. Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero 
del Tesoro, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 377. 
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transfer of funds not be allowed. 161 This has been recognized by the Eel in 
narrowly defining capital under Article 67 to mean in effect "investment capi-
tal," to be distinguished from "means of payment" under Article 106(1).162 The 
language of Article 71,I6s however, is considerably weaker than that found in 
the articles relating to free movement of goods, persons, and services. Given 
the important role that capital plays in national economic and monetary policy, 
it is not altogether surprising that there has been little progress in implementing 
liberalization of capital, except in the spheres of current payments which are 
essential to the free movement of the other factors of production. There has 
been recent action in this spherel64 mainly relating to liberalization of capital 
movements for transactions involving securities. 
Similarly, stable exchange rates, valued by all states, are more critical to states 
participating in a common market where exchange-rate-induced distortions 
could cause much more competitive havoc as other barriers to trade have been 
dismantled. The Treaty of Rome was even more cautious on exchange-rate 
policies than on the movement of capital where the provisions are hedged 
around with safeguards. 165 Article 107(1) obliges member states to treat rates 
of exchange "as a matter of common concern." No powers are granted to 
implement any sort of policy whatsoever. The European Monetary System does 
help stabilize exchange rates, but this has grown up largely outside of formal 
Treaty arrangements, and not all member states are parties to it. ISS 
161 Thus, the directives on free movement of capital allow workers to remit wages. See, e.g., 20 oJ. 
EUR. COMM. (No. L 332/22)(1986)(Directive 86/566). 
162 Article 106( I) provides: 
Each Member State undertakes to authorize, in the currency of the Member State in which 
the creditor or beneficiary resides, any payments connected with the movement of goods, 
services or capital, and any transfers of capital and earnings, to the extent that the movement 
of goods, services and capital and persons between Member States has been liberalized 
pursuant to this Treaty. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 106( I). 
163 Article 71 states: 
Member States shall endeavor to avoid introducing within the Community any new ex-
change restrictions on the movement of capital and current payments connected with such 
movements, and shall endeavor not to make existing rules more restrictive. 
They declare their readiness to go beyond the degree of liberalization of capital movements 
provided for in the preceding articles in so far as their economic situation, in particular their 
balance of payments, so permits. 
The Commission may, after consulting the Monetary Committee, make recommendations 
to Member States on this subject. 
EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 71. 
164 Directive 86/566, supra note 161. 
165 Exchange rates were in fact "fixed" under the Bretton Woods Agreement so the matter was 
undoubtedly of less significance when the EEC Treaty was adopted in 1957. 
166 One of the European Monetary System's more interesting components is the trade-weighted 
European Currency Unit (ECU), which can be used as a means of settlement between the monetary 
authorities of the participant states, and is increasingly used by the private commercial sector. The 
Belgian authorities issued a monetary coin the ECU in celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the 
signing of the EEC Treaty. The ECU is potentially a future Community currency. 
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C. The Reform Possibilities 
It had been recognized for some time that the Community needed a reform. 167 
The increase in the size of the Community from ten states to twelve in 1986 
was a tribute to its success but also provided an opportunity to reform and 
relaunch the Community so that it could achieve at least some of its original 
objectives. Despite the general gloom about the lack of progress168 in achieving 
the objectives of the Community,169 the Community and European integration 
cannot be considered to have entirely stopped their forward progress. 
Although the center of political gravity may be moving to the European (as 
opposed to national) stage, this has not enhanced the legitimacy of the Com-
munity institutions in BrusselS. 170 The member states have managed to hijack 
the political high ground. This is symbolically evidenced by the rise of the 
European Council and the fact that it meets in the national capitals. The 
resulting slowdown and ineffectiveness of decision-making in the Community 
has caused severe problems for the creation of the internal market, which is 
the centerpiece for any European integration and vital to European economic 
health in a competitive world. The ECl through its judgments has ameliorated 
these problems to some extent. The court alone, however, cannot establish a set 
of common standards. The court's limitations are illustrated by its jurisprudence 
on free movement of goods and indirect taxes. l7l The Commission, however, 
has made some positive strides toward the creation of an internal market as 
illustrated by its actions with regard to technical harmonization. 
It has not been clear how to press forward. In the European Parliament there 
were two main schools of thought about the appropriate way to tackle these 
issues. The "Crocodiles"172 wished to have a wholesale reform sweeping over 
the existing Treaties and reinforcing them with a brand new vision leading to 
167 See F. CAPOTORTI, M. HILF, F. JACOBS & J. JACQUE, THE EUROPEAN UNION TREATY (1986) 
[hereinafter CAPOTORTll for a succinct analysis of reform attempts and an overview of the Parliament's 
European Union Treaty. 
168 See supra note 15. 
169 These are formally set out in the EEC Treaty, arts. 1-3; the EAEC Treaty, supra note I, at arts. 
1-3; and the ECSC Treaty, supra note I, at arts. 1-3, but many sought for a "supranational" Europe 
or United States of Europe. Measured against these broader aspirations, there is some cause for gloom. 
See generally THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (L. Tsoukalis ed. 1983), reprinted 
in 21 j. COMM. MKT. STUD. After the implementation of the Treaty obligations to be achieved by the 
end of the transitional period (stipulations which were quite clearly set out: traite loi) the decision-
making procedures came under great pressure to implement common policies and other not fully 
stipulated requirements (traite cadre). This pressure led to a crisis in 1965 that was resolved by the 
Luxembourg Compromise whereby states won the right to block decisions if a "vital interest" was at 
stake. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra text accompanying notes 12-39. 
171 See supra text accompanying notes 121-144. 
172 A group founded by Altiero Spinelli in 1980 to promote European union. 
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European Union. 173 The "Kangaroos,"174 in contrast, wished to reform the 
present Treaties so as to "leap over" the barriers that currently exist to full and 
free intra-community trade. A further possible solution would have been to 
follow the trends being set and thus be content with a multi-speed Europe, a 
Europe in which not all the member states participate in all the policies. I75 The 
SEA does not promote a two-speed Europe in the sense that the EP's Draft 
Treaty of European Union might have permitted. Article 82 of the draft treaty 
envisaged the treaty coming into force even without adhesion of all the member 
states. This prospect is ruled out for the SEA, as Article 236 requires ratification 
by all member states before it can come into force. I76 
The specter of Europe Ii fa carte 177 is only a frightening prospect if the menu 
relates to activities mandated by Community law proper. There is no harm at 
all in a two-speed or multi-speed Europe as long as the two-speed element is 
not within the framework of Community law itself. In a multi-speed Europe, 
core common policies could not be the object of choice by member states. If a 
multi-speed Europe was created within these areas, then the system of Com-
munity law itself would be threatened, for the edifice of uniformity, so necessary 
for a true and effective legal order, would be shattered. I78 Ehlermann has 
pointed outI79 that there are within the Treaties, and even within Community 
secondary law, some sanctioned elements of differentiation. I80 The examples 
that he cites, however, are all related to actual differences and difficulties of a 
strong political nature (and agreed to by all the member states). Those that are 
not of a strong political nature are temporary aberrations without prejudice to 
173 Jacque, The Draft Treaty Establishing European Union, 22 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 19 (l985); Lodge, 
Freestone & Davidson, Some Problems of the Draft Treaty on European Union, 9 EUR. L. REV. 387 (l984). 
See also CAPOTORTI, supra note 167. The Parliament's proposed Treaty of Union would, if adopted, 
have greatly increased the powers of the Parliament and ensured a more democratically controlled 
"union," 
174 The Kangaroos are a rival European parliamentary group dedicated to fully implementing the 
existing treaties and particularly to finalizing the establishment of the internal market. 
175 Tindemans Report, EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp. 1/76). See also Mitchell, The Tindemans Report, 13 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 455 (l976). See generally Nicoll, Paths to European Union, 23 J. COMM. MKT. 
STUD. 199 (l985), and Langeheine & Weinstock, Graduated Integration: A Modest Path Towards Progress, 
23 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 185 (1985). Article 35 of the EP's draft Treaty would have permitted this 
type of differentiation. See CAPOTORTI, supra note 167, at 142. 
176 See Jacque, supra note 173, at 41; and CAPOTORTl, supra note 167, at 305. 
m See generally Europe a la Carte, Jean Monnet Lecture, presented by R. Dahrendorf at the Euro-
pean University Institute, Florence, Italy (l979). 
178 Community law, though, does allow temporal differences in the implementation of Community 
policies. Thus, for example, transitional arrangements are sanctioned by the Treaties. 
179 Ehlermann, How Flexible is Community Law?: An Unusual Approach to the Concept of "Two-Speeds," 
82 MICH. L. REV. 1274 (1984). See also Grabitz & Langeheine, Legal Problems Related to a Proposed "Two-
Tier System" of Integration Within the European Community, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 33 (l981). 
180 The safeguard clauses, e.g. Article 224, the special status accorded to East Germany and the New 
Zealand butter protocol. 
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the unity of Community law and not threatening the fundamental principle of 
free intra-community trade. 181 The multi-speed elements do not presently pose 
a threat to the Community's aims. Whether the SEA threatens the structure of 
Community law uniformity by allowing a "negative" type of Europe d la carte 
will be assessed below. 
The inter-governmental conference that spawned the SEA was called by the 
European Council in June 1985. 182 The European Parliament had a major role 
in motivating the member states to sit around a negotiating table. [83 Although 
the European Parliament's draft Treaty of Union has very little in common 
with the final SEA adopted. The Commission had also been very active[84 in 
trying to stimulate the member states to confront the compelling challenges 
facing the European Community, one of its major contributions being Lord 
Cockfield's White Paper on completing the internal market. 185 The European 
Council itself had set up two ad hoc committees, the first on institutional affairs 
(Dooge Committee)186 and the second on a "People's Europe" (Adonnino Com-
mittee),187 which reported to the March Council although their reports were 
not fully considered until the Milan Summit. 
The Luxembourg Conference was primarily designed to do two things: to 
revise the Treaty of Rome and to incorporate into the Treaty of Rome or into 
a separate treaty, provisions on political cooperation and European security.[88 
The outcome was the SEA, signed on February 17 and 28, 1986.[89 Both matters 
181 Grabitz & Langeheine, supra note 179. In this note, the authors point out that in the context of 
establishing the common market "the possibilities of differentiation between member states are rather 
limited" and that exceptions must be limited to those provided by the Treaty (e.g. Article 36), and 
time extensions on implementing Community law. [d. at 42. 
182 This was called by a majority (seven to three) vote. The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Greece 
voted against the measure. 
183 See Lodge, The Single European Act: Towards a New Euro-dynamism?, 24 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 203 
(1986) and De Zwaan, The Single European Act: Conclusion of a Unique Document, 23 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 747, 748, 763 (1986). 
18. See, e.g., 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 22211 7) (1986)(Comett). 
185 White Paper, supra note 3. 
186 3 EUR. COMM. BULL. 102 (1985). The pertinent passage states: "The Committee has placed itself 
firmly on the political level, and ... proposes to set out the objectives policies and institutional reforms 
which are necessary to restore to Europe the vigour and ambition of its inception." [d. at 102. It 
proposed negotiation of a draft Treaty of Union based on the acquis communautaire, its own report, 
and the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union. It also proposed to be "guided" overall by 
the EP's draft Treaty. 
187 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee. [d. at Ill. 
188 Two separate bodies were charged with these tasks. The Working Party (Groupe Preparatoire) on 
Revising the EEC Treaty was composed of members of CORE PER with the addition of M. Dondelinger 
(the chairman, Luxembourg holding the European Council Presidency), and M. Noel (the secretary 
general of the EC Commission) representing the Commission. The Political Committee on drafting a 
Treaty on Political Co-operation consisted of directors of political affairs of the member states with a 
Commission representative. See generally De Zwaan, supra note 183, on the progress of the negotiations. 
189 The entire drafting of the SEA was completed between September and December 1986. See De 
Zwaan, supra note 183, for a detailed account of the history of the negotiations. 
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were treated in a single document which has now been ratified by all the member 
states. 190 
In the negotiations leading up to the signing of the SEA, it was clear that 
some member states were more willing than others to move ahead. 191 Spain and 
Portugal took full part in the negotiations of the SEA and their impact, and the 
increased weight of the "Southern" states, were clearly felt and are visible in 
the final outcome. 
The outcome of the negotiations was a "kangaroo" style reform. 19' It is no 
great surprise that the Kangaroos won, given the treatment meted out to the 
Genscher-Colombo proposals in 1983.193 
III. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 
The SEA is divided into four titles. Title I establishes the objectives of the 
European Community and European political cooperation: 194 "to mak[e] con-
crete progress towards European unity." European political cooperation is ex-
plicitly based on Title III of the SEA and "the practices gradually established 
among the Member States."19S This ensures, when combined with Article 3(2) 
of Title I of the SEA, that the European political cooperation process remains 
outside the main treaty process, and is not amenable to any action in the ECj.196 
Article 2 confirms the place and existence of the European Council and ensures 
that the institution will meet at least biannually. Article 3(1) establishes that the 
institutions of the European Community are governed by the Treaties estab-
lishing them (as amended). Title II of the SEA substantially amends some 
aspects of the operation of the institutions of the European Community. 
Title III of the SEA formalizes the existing European political coopera-
tion l97 arrangements. It does not bring them within the scope of Community 
190 Comm'd 9758, reprinted in EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp. 2/86). All the member states have now 
ratified the new treaty. Poetically, Lord Denning has now embraced the rising European SEA. The 
Times (London), Nov. 3,1986, at 20, col. 2. In a famous judgment, Bulmer v. Bollinger, [1974] 2 All 
E.R. 1226, he likened Community law to an incoming tide. 
191 Italy felt that the final outcome was not taking the Community far enough and threatened to 
block ratification. The Danes, on other hand, feeling that the SEA went too far, almost refused to 
ratify the SEA. 
192 The European Parliament created the SEA with grave misgivings, Mr. Spinelli considering it a 
"miserable stillborn mouse". 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 36)(1986). 
193 The Genscher-Colombo proposals became the feeble Solemn Declaration on European Union. 
See Hendry, Of Cabbages and Kings, 8 EUR. L. REv. 394 (1984). See also Weiler, The Genscher-Colombo 
Draft European Act, 1983, EUR. J. INTEG. 129. 
194 SEA, supra note 10, at art. 1(1). 
195 As exemplified in the (nonbinding) Declarations of previous European Council meetings specified 
in Article 1(3) of the SEA. 
196 Articles 31 and 32 in Title IV confirm this. 
197 See Nuttall, European Political Cooperation and the Single European Act, 5 Y.B.E.L. 203 (1985). See 
also Freestone & Davidson, Community Competence and Part III of the Single European Act, 23 COMMON 
MKT. L. REv. 793 (1986). 
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law,19B but it does not give them a firm footing in international law. The pro-
cedures remain inter-governmental. 
The novelty in Article 30 lies in the inclusion of security matters as a matter 
for coordination of policies. 199 The SEA additionally provides for a secretariat 
to service the Presidency. This is a welcome step. Everything in the SEA con-
cerning Title III seeks to ensure that the whole procedure remains beyond the 
scope of the European Community proper. Title IV of the SEA contains general 
and final provisions. 
To be considered a success the SEA should refashion the decision-making 
process to make it more democratic and effective, and, ideally, demolish the 
member states' ability to use the Luxembourg compromise veto. It should also 
ideally incorporate the advances made by the European Community in areas of 
policy where the European Community has acted outside the Treaties, or within 
the Treaties, but with a marginal attribution of competence.2DD The SEA should 
also add new areas of competence in fields in which the Community wishes and 
needs to act. Critically, it should also open the way to full free movement of 
goods by knocking out the remaining nontariff barriers to trade. Remedying 
the decision-making defects to enable the necessary advances and decisions to 
be made would amount to a great achievement. 
Attached to the Single European act, in a Final Act, are two lists of declara-
tions: those adopted by the inter-governmental conference and those noted by 
the conference. The former category must be considered likely to have a strong 
effect on the interpretation and operation of the SEA, though they do not form 
an integral part of the SEA as they are not subject to ratification. The latter 
category are comprised of declarations made by individual parties at the con-
ference. As these are "noted by" the conference, one may assume that they will 
have less of an effect than those "adopted by" the conference. However, where 
they are applicable, and relied on by the states that made them in the political 
process,201 they are potentially very damaging to the practical operation and 
198 This results from Article 3, combined with Articles 31 and 32 of the SEA. See SEA, supra note 
10. 
199 SEA, supra note 10, at art. 30(6). This led to an injunction in the Irish courts delaying the 
depositing of the Irish Instrument of Ratification to the SEA. Crotty v. An Taoiseach, 49 Common Mkt. 
L.R. 666 (1987). 
200 Such areas include environmental law, energy policy, regional policy, health and safety at work. 
The Dooge Committee report called for, inter alia, action to encourage a technological community, 
and to strengthen the EMS, and for measures to protect the environment, promote common cultural 
values, achieve a European social area (employment considerations), promote a European judicial 
area, and encourage a stronger external identity for Europe. 
201 Toth, The Legal Status of the Declarations Annexed to the Single European Act, 23 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 803 (1986), makes a convincing argument that the ECJ would not be able to use these Declarations 
as an interpretive guideline as to the effects of the Declarations. This follows from Article 31 of the 
SEA which explicitly confers competence on the ECJ as regards Title II and Article 32 of the SEA 
only. Jacque, L'Acte unique Europien, 22 R.T.D.E. 575, 581 (\986), agrees. 
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application of the SEA. These declarations are considered below in their context. 
The only reform that concerns all three Communities is that dealing with the 
ECl 
A. Institutional Matters 
1. The European Court of 1 ustice 
The SEA provides for the ECl to have attached to it a court of first instance.202 
The court is to be set up by the Council of Ministers at the request of the ECl, 
and will have jurisdiction to deal only with cases emanating from "natural or 
legal persons."203 There will be a right of appeal to the ECl on points of law.204 
When this is implemented, it will mean at the very least a dramatic increase in 
speed for the ECl The new court of first instance is likely to dispose of all staff 
cases,205 and might possibly provide an initial forum to deal with the complex 
and time-consuming competition and antidumping litigation as well.206 It may 
well also mean that actions by individuals challenging Community legislation 
directly will be squeezed through the new court. The new court will thus 
potentially save the ECl from the bulk of cases that involve a heavy load of fact-
finding, leaving the ECJ the sweeter task of laying down the law.207 
Moreover, the provisions on the composition of the new court differ from 
the original in that, while independence is still required, the persons appointed 
need only "have the ability required for appointment to judicial office ... " as 
opposed to "the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices .... "208 This opens up the possibility of (legally trained) specialists in 
nonlegal fields being appointed to the new court. Thus, the new court may 
sport specialists in arbitration, social security, or a host of other fields. This is 
likely to be a major advantage in complex economic cases. 
Sensibly, the new court of first instance will not be able to deal with Article 
177 references.209 A two-tier structure for these cases would diminish the ben-
efits of a more efficient system of justice and possibly create conflicting opinions 
202 Article 4 of the SEA adds Article 32D to the ECSC Treaty, supra note I; Article 26 of the SEA 
adds Article l40A to the EAEC Treaty, supra note I; and Article II of the SEA adds Article 168A to 
the EEC Treaty, supra note I. 
203 ESCS Treaty, supra note I, at art. 32d(l); EAEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 140A(I); EEC Treaty, 
supra note I, at art. 168A(I). 
204 The exact way that this will work is not set out; whether the ECl will exercise some control over 
which appeals it hears is not yet known. 
205 Presently comprising one of the bulkiest classes of the court's caseload. See infra note 210. 
206 See Glaesner, L'Acte Unique Europeen, 1986 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 307, 310. 
207 Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted against Private Plaintiffs, 5 EUR. L. REV. 112 (1980). 
208 ESCS Treaty, supra note I, at art. 32d(3); EAEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 140A(3); EEC Treaty, 
supra note I, at art. 168(3). 
209 See supra notes 88 and 95 and accompanying text. 
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on interpretation, which the current system of collegiate judgments keeps to a 
mInimum. 
Regardless of the jurisdictional attributes that the new court of first instance 
will be given, any court of first instance will be welcome since the ECl's heavy 
workload has created severe delays.2lo One criticism of the provisions on the 
court, made forcefully by a former celebrated member of the ECJ,211 is that it 
makes it easier for the Council of Ministers to revise Title IIp2 of the court's 
statute.213 He feared that the Council of Ministers might exercise their powers 
to threaten certain essential procedural guarantees. 
2. Decision-making 
Articles 6 through 8 of the SEA establish a new "co-operation procedure" in 
the legislative process that essentially gives the European Parliament more 
influence in the process of legislation.214 It does not amount to a decisive 
influence, however. Only in the fields of Articles 237 and 238 is the Parliament 
given a true power of co-decision. Article 237 deals with applications for mem-
bership in the Community,2I5 and Article 238 deals with association agreements. 
The provisions relating to international commercial agreements are left un-
changed. 
The new cooperation procedure (described below) does not replace the old 
procedure in every instance. 216 This new procedure is used when the Council 
is required to act by qualified majority, except in relation to decisions concerning 
the free movement of capital and the common transport policy. The decisions 
to be taken under Articles 70 and 84 are now to be by qualified maJority rather 
than by unanimity. There are also, however, several steps backwards. For ex-
210 The general increase in the workload of the court has lowered staff cases as a percentage of the 
court's work. In 1985 the three top categories of decided cases were 
Free movement of goods 51 
Agriculture 50 
Staff cases 49 
The total number of cases decided was 254. See Synopsis of the Work of the Court in 1985, reprinted in 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 392 (ch. 4 annex 1986). 
211 Pescatore, Observations Critiques sur "L'Acte Unique Europeen," reprinted in ACTES DE LA JOURNEE 
D'ETUDES DE BRUXELLES SUR "L'AcTE UNIQUE EUROPEEN" (Mar. 10,1986). 
212 This title deals with the court's procedure. 
213 This originally was made part of the EEC Treaty, and was thus amenable to revision only through 
Article 236. 
214 See Lodge, supra note 183, at 213-215, for background to these proposals. See also Bieber, Pantalis 
& Schoo, Implications of the Single Act for the European Parliament, 23 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 767, 779 
(1986). 
215 Turkey, however, has applied for membership. The Times (London), Apr. 15, 1987, at 6, col. 4. 
216 Article 6(1) of the Single European Act specifies in which instances the new co-operation pro-
cedure is to be used. SEA, supra note 10. 
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ample, decisions under Article 49, previously to be taken by majority, must 
henceforth be taken by qualified majority. The new addition to Article 70(1) 
even contemplates the deliberalization ("steps backwards") of capital move-
ments. 
The cooperation procedure itself is set out in revised Article 149, paragraph 
2. The process commences in the same way as previously: that is, the Commis-
sion proposes, the European Parliament gives an opinion, and then the Council, 
instead of adopting a decision takes up a "common position." The common 
position is sent to the European Parliament along with the reasons for its 
adoption, and the Commission's attitude towards it.217 The Parliament must 
then act within three months. It may (1) do nothing, or (2) approve the common 
position, or (3) by an absolute majority of its component members propose 
amendments to the common position, or (4) by an absolute majority of its 
component members reject the Council's common position. 
The results of the European Parliament's action are sent to both the Council 
and the Commission. In cases (1) and (2) above the Council "shall definitively 
adopt the act ... in accordance with the common position."21B In cases (3) and 
(4) the Commission must reexamine the proposal within one month, in the light 
of the European Parliament's amendments. The Commission is, of course, 
allowed to alter its proposal at this stage. The Commission then forwards its 
reexamined proposal to the Council, which must act within three months. The 
Commission must also send the European Parliament's amendments, and its 
opinion on the amendments if it has not accepted them, to the Council. The 
Council may now adopt the European Parliament's amendments by unanimity, 
or accept the Commission's reexamined proposal by qualified majority. It may 
still amend the Commission's proposals if unanimous. This means that there is 
no particular incentive to adopt the European Parliament's position, for if it 
can muster unanimity it can amend the proposal as it will. But the European 
Parliament now at least has a chance that its legislative proposal may be acted 
on. Previously the Commission had the exclusive right in amending its proposals 
to decide whether to accept, modify, incorporate or ignore the Parliament's 
suggestions. 
The time limits in this decision-making process may be extended by one 
month if the Council and Parliament both so agree. The time limits are enforced 
on the Council by Article 149(2)(f) which effectively kills the proposal if the 
time limit is exceeded. 
217 Under the new Article 149(1), as before. the Council may not amend the Commission proposal 
except by unanimity. SEA. sufrra note 10. 
218 The Inter-governmental Conference adopted a Declaration whereby the presidency.undertook 
to "complet[e] the work in question as soon as possible." See EUR. COMM. BULL. Supp. (2/86). 
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There is clearly greater scope for delay under these proceedings and simple 
decisions will take longer than before. The effects of the reforms, apart from 
the above, will probably be to cause the Council and Commission to give more 
weight to the European Parliament's opinion, while still leaving the Commission, 
and more particularly the Council, with the whip hand. It has hardly democ-
ratized the decision-making process, but must be regarded only as a small and 
time-consuming reform. Arguably, it might now be more worthwhile to lobby 
members of the European Parliament concerning worrying proposals, as the 
Parliament's amendments do stand a chance of being adopted, if not by the 
Commission then by a unanimous Council of Ministers. The automatic cut-out 
caused by the strict time limits is likely to increase the ability of the member 
states to block unwanted legislation. Manipulation of the Council of Ministers' 
agenda will increase in importance, thus strengthening the hand of the member 
state holding the Presidency. 
The position of the Luxembourg compromise (being a nonlegal or even 
unlawful convention) is in no way mentioned or affected by the provisions of 
the SEA. It is likely to be more difficult, politically speaking, to use it because 
of the political momentum built up by a proposal having the support of the 
Commission, a majority of the European Parliament, and a qualified majority 
of the Council of Ministers.219 On the other hand, it may be cogently argued 
that because the SEA does not allow the EP a true role, the Luxembourg veto 
will continue to be used as an expression of the national democratic will, via 
national ministers responsible to national Parliaments. In sum, the reforms 
neither democratize the decision-making procedure nor reduce the inter-gov-
ernmental aspects of the procedure. They can be seen as a step on the way to 
such ends, however, since the European Parliament will have a higher profile. 
3. Delegation of Power to the Commission 
Article 10 of the SEA, by altering Article 145, allows the Council to confer 
implementation powers on the Commission.220 This merely consolidates current 
Community practice, and does not necessarily mean that there will be a true 
delegation of power. The Council may still recall the decision to itselp21 The 
rules relating to the modus operandi of this arrangement are to be decided by 
219 See H.L. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND 
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 258-59. 
220 The Commission had considered that an amendment to Article 155 would be more appropriate. 
221 Management Committee and Regulatory Committee procedures are likely to continue as before. 
See Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle v. Koster, Berodt & Co., 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1161; and Scheer 
v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle, 1970 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. 1197, where the legality of the management 
committee procedure including the right of the Council to make its delegation of power conditional 
was upheld by the Court. 
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the Council acting unanimously on the proposal of the Commission, after 
receiving the opinion of the European Parliament. 
The Commission has proposed222 three types of procedures for implementing 
delegated powers. The first of these is an advisory procedure, which gives the 
Commission the greatest leeway in that the Commission sets up the committee.223 
As no votes are taken (its function being advisory), the Commission is afforded 
great discretion as to what measures to take. The second method of delegation 
provides for the familiar management committee procedure where represen-
tatives of the member states may vote by qualified majority against a Commission 
measure. This causes the measure to revert to the Council, which may then 
take an alternative decision. The third procedure provides for a regulatory 
committee. Under this method of delegation. the Commission measure will have 
no effect unless it is supported by a qualified majority of member state repre-
sentatives. The European Parliament has suggested deleting the latter type of 
committee and written itself a role in the management and advisory proce-
dures. 224 The Commission favors the Advisory Committee procedure and has 
already put forward several significant proposals225 that use this method in 
accordance with the declaration adopted by the inter-governmental confer-
ence.226 If the Council agrees to this method of delegation, then it will mark a 
truly amazing step forward in the decision-making process. Whole sectors of 
the market could be harmonized without great political trauma. 
B. Internal Market Matters 
Section II of Title II of the SEA deals with the internal market. The provisions 
of the SEA in this field have been criticized as retrograde, as they peel back the 
acquis communautaire227 and herald the beginning of a two-speed Europe. 
Article 13 incorporates a new Article SA into the Treaty of Rome. This 
commits the member states to bring in measures to "progressively establish" the 
222 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 70/6)( 1986). The proposal is still before the Council. 
223 Presumably made up of national experts, though the proposal does not specify this. 
224 See 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 227/54)(1986). The European Parliament suggested that all 
measures submitted to an advisory Committee be simultaneously tabled in the European Parliament, 
and that it be consulted in the management committee procedure where the Commission measure is 
rejected by the representatives of member states. ld. 
225 On food additives, see 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc.(No. 87) (1986); 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. 
(No. 89) (1986); and 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 90) (1986), where the advisory committee 
procedure is to be used to help speed through the necessary directives. 
226 This Declaration reads in its relevant part as follows: 
[T]he Conference requests the Council to give the Advisory Committee procedure in partic-
ular a predominant place in the interests of speed and efficiency in the decision-making 
process, for the exercise of the powers of implementation conferred on the Commission 
within the field of Article 100A of the EEC Treaty. 
See EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp. 2/86). 
227 Pescatore, supra note 211. 
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internal market by the end of 1992. The internal market is then defined as 
compromising "an area228 without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Treaty." 
At first sight this provision is most alarming. Does it undo what has already 
been achieved? Does it open up a new transitional period ending in 1992?229 
The terms of the article itself give some relief from this fear. The measures to 
be adopted to "progressively establish the internal market" are measures "in 
accordance with" the newly added competence of the European Community230 
and are expressed to be "without prejudice" to the other provisions of the 
Treaty of Rome. The amendments, although giving some new explicit 
competencies231 in other areas confirm the weakness of the Treaty.232 The terms 
used, however, do widen the original aims of the European Community since 
the removal of internal frontiers is a much sought after objective.233 One must 
note that the member states in conference adopted a declaration reserving their 
right to maintain frontier controls "for the purpose of controlling immigration 
from third countries, and to combat terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and 
illicit trading in art or antiques" as the member states thought necessary.234 
The 1992 deadline is expressly declared to have no legal effect by a further 
declaration.235 This, the member states hope, will ensure that the ECl cannot 
228 The use of the terms "internal market" and "area without internal frontiers" is apparently all 
that remains of the Commission's attempt to open up a citizen's Europe without boundaries. Statement 
of Claus Diefer Ehlermann at 1986 B.I.C.L. meeting, 
229 The original transitional period for establishing the common market expired at the end of 1969. 
230 This was in accordance with Articles 8B. 8C, 28. 57(2). 59. 70(1). 84. 99. 100A and 100B. 
231 See infra text accompanying notes 262-63. 
'" See e.g" SEA. supra note 10 at art, 70(1) (regarding capital movements). The article introduces 
qualified majority voting, but then states that "unanimity shall be required for measures which con-
stitute a step back"! The contemplation of steps back in an area where there have been hardly any 
steps forward is hardly reassuring. and indicative of the mood of the member states as they drafted 
this amendment. 
'" The terms are also narrower in some matters as the definition does not include, inter alia. 
transport. agriculture or competition policies as does the original Article 3 of the EEC Treaty. 
234 This list does not extend what the ECJ felt was permissible in Commission v. Italy. 1979 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3247, The Court found that frontier checks were permitted only where allowed 
under Article 36. or for levying internal taxes. or for transit controls or statistical purposes, declaring 
that residuary controls must be reduced as far as possible "so that trade between member states can 
take place in conditions as close as possible to those prevalent on a domestic market." [d, Note also 
the effect of the Commission Proposal on combatting counterfeiting. 1984-1985 EUR. PARL. Doc. 
(COM No. 703)(1984), 
235 The Conference's Declaration of Article 8A reads as follows: 
The Conference wishes by means of the provisions in Article 8A to express its firm political 
will to take before I January 1993 the decisions necessary to complete the internal market 
defined in those provisions, and more particularly the decisions necessary to implement the 
Commission's programme described in the White Paper on the Internal Market. Setting the 
date of 31 December 1992 does not create an automatic legal effect. 
See EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp. 2/86). 
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declare article 8A to be of direct effect at the end of 1992.236 The member 
states clearly feel that article 8A extends the competence of the EEC or they 
would not have felt it necessary to take this precaution. Even without the above 
qualifying declaration, the combined effects of Articles 8B and 8C would have 
probably dissuaded the court from any declaration of direct effect. This inter-
pretation is reinforced by Article 100B which foresees a lack of complete success 
under Article 100A and provides a means to achieve it.237 
The effects of Article 8A are further weakened by a new Article 8B which 
requires the Commission to report to the Council by the end of 1988 and again 
before the end of 1990 on the progress achieved towards the internal market. 
The Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, 
is to set out "guidelines and conditions necessary to ensure balanced progress 
in all the sectors concerned."238 The Commission, moreover, in drawing up its 
proposal, is required by Article 8C to take account of "the effort" that the 
different economies will have to sustain while the internal market is being 
established. Article 8C allows the Commission to propose "temporary" derog-
ations that "must cause the least possible disturbance to the functioning of the 
common market."239 This concession was presumably necessary to get the mem-
ber states to agree to the reform at all, but may mean that all non tariff barriers 
may not be knocked down by January 1, 1993.240 Article 8C certainly seems to 
allow an element of the multi-speed Europe, though such differentiation is to 
be temporally limited. 
Article 8C talks of "certain economies showing differences in develop-
ment."24I The avoidance of the term "member state" implies that the European 
Community is bowing to regional pressures, although a member state's economy 
as a whole is not excluded. As Glaesner suggests, there is a link between this 
provision and the new Title IV provisions on economic and social cohesion, 
which really amount to a new title for commitment to regional policy.242 The 
fact that Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Italy can now combine their 
weighted votes to block Community legislation that would otherwise diminish 
the role of regional policy will be a significant factor in the decision-making 
process where it calls for a qualified majority vote.243 
256 See Toth, supra note 201, at 812 (the author believes that such a hope is clearly misplaced). 
237 See infra note 259 and accompanying text. 
25. EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 8B. 
239 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 8C. 
240 This impression is reinforced by Article 100B. 
241 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 8C. 
242 See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
243 Article 148(2) sets out the weighing of member states votes for purposes of qualified majority 
voting. 54 votes are needed for a Commission proposal to be adopted. The combined votes of Spain 
(8), Portugal (5), Greece (5), Ireland (3) and Italy (10) are sufficient to block a decision. SEA, supra 
note 10. 
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Having set out the objectives (and the derogations from those aims) the Single 
Act goes on to provide novel methods for seeking harmonization. Article 8A244 
provides that "the Community shall adopt measures."245 The new measures are 
to be decided in accordance with Article 1 00A.246 This article in derogation 
from Article 100 (which required unanimity) allows decision-making by a qual-
ified majority in the Council using the new cooperation procedure.247 On the 
positive side, Article 100A(3) provides that the Commission must take as a base 
a high level of protection when dealing with health, safety, and environmental 
and consumer protection.24R This is an attempt to avoid the lowest common 
denominator effect of Community harmonization and to diminish the necessity 
for member states to avail themselves of their rights under paragraphs 4 and 5 
of Article 100A. The use of a qualified majority to take approximation decisions 
is clearly preferable to the unanimity requirement. Arguably, parts of Article 
100A represent a step backwards for the Community. Paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 
place severe handicaps and limitations on this new provision. 
First, in paragraph 2, fiscal provisions, free movement of persons, and the 
rights of employed persons are all excluded from its scope. The needed reforms 
in these areas must therefore follow the particular requirements applying to 
them under the amended EEC Treaty.249 The free movement of goods, services, 
and capital, being part of the newly defined internal market and not subject to 
this reservation, may have decisions taken under this new procedure where the 
institutions are not acting under specifically attributed powers. 
Second, and far more serious, paragraph 4 allows member states to ignore 
the newly created Community measure and apply its own rules, not only on the 
grounds elaborated in Article 36,250 but also on the grounds of protecting the 
environment and the working environment. A member state may not simply 
ignore a Community rule. It must notify the Commission, which then assesses 
whether the national measure is an arbitrary discrimination or disguised restric-
244 This Article itself is not that strong. Although the Conference in a declaration on Article 8A 
declares its "firm political will" to take the decisions necessary to complete the internal market by 
Januarv I, 1993 it specifically declares that the 1992 deadline "does not create automatic legal effect." 
See EUR. COMM. BULL. (Supp 2/86). 
245 The Commission wishes these "measures" to be directives, thus allowing member states flexibility. 
See Declaration 4 adopted by the Conference. This combined with delegation under Article 155 and 
the use of Advisory Committees would significantly enhance the decision-making progress in this field. 
216 Article 100A refers back to Article 8A. SEA, supra note 10. 
"7 [d. 
241:l These matters currently cause grave problems for the free movement of goods. See supra text 
accompanying notes 63-120. 
249 Articles 49, 54, 56, and 57 are amended to allow the Council of Ministers to decide, under the 
new cooperation procedure matters dealing with the free movement of workers, the implementation 
of the programme on freedom of establishment, the harmonization of safeguard measures, the rights 
of the self-employed,and the recognition of diplomas. 
250 See supra note 69. 
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tion on trade between the member states.251 Another control measure allows 
the Commission or another member state to bring any suspected abuse of this 
provision directly to the ECJ for a ruling. This procedure is expressly stated to 
be in derogation from the normal Article 169-170 requirements.252 
Under paragraph 5 the harmonization measures may include a safeguard 
provision allowing member states to derogate from the new measures for any 
of the (noneconomic) reasons set out in Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, 
subject to a "Community control procedure." 
As mentioned above, Article 100A(4) at first sight seems to indicate that a 
two-speed Europe is nigh.253 Undeniably it extends the scope of Article 36 by 
adding two further grounds for member state noncompliance. More critically, 
it overturns a jurisprudence constante to the effect that once harmonization mea-
sures have been adopted, member states may no longer rely on the grounds 
laid out in Article 36 to justify their own national measures.254 As health and 
safety barriers have not been overcome so far, the member states presumably 
considered, in adopting this paragraph, that some progress was better than 
none. The acquis communautaire has not yet extended to deny member states the 
right to protect the health and safety of their populations.255 
But even though the measure does represent an advance in this sense, beware, 
for a Community measure, because of this provision, may not be applicable in 
some member states. This is despite the fact that it may be addressed to all 
member states, with strict temporal limits for implementation,256 and despite its 
unconditional, clear, and precise language.257 The principle of uniformity of 
Community law has been breached, and the related concepts of direct effect 
and supremacy also suffer a blow. Thus, the damage potentially wreaked by 
Article 100A is not in the substantive law field but in the more important 
foundations of Community law. Whether the advances generated by Article 
100A justify this weakening of the Community legal order remains to be seen. 
251 A similar test is found in the second sentence of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1. 
252 Undoubtedly an aggrieved individual could also bring an action before his national court and 
seek a reference under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1. 
253 Pescatore, supra note 211. 
254 See, e.g., Carlo Tedesci v. Denkavit Commerciale, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1555. But note that 
the mere existence of Community measures is not enough. See Campus Oil, supra note 103, and C.M.C. 
Melkunie, supra note 80. 
m See Campus Oil, supra note 103. See also Van Bennekom, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3883 and 
C.M.C. Melkunie, supra note 80. The ECj will test the member state rules to ensure that they are not 
disproportionate to the aims sought, but as we have seen above, the Court has given great leeway to 
states pleading public health or environmental safety. 
256 Directives will only have "direct effect" once the time limit for implementation has expired. See 
Publico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1629. 
257 All conditions necessary before Community law including directives will be directly effective. See, 
e.g., Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455. 
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It is made all the more serious in that there is no time limit imposed upon the 
reserving member state.258 
The provisions of Article lOOA(4) only apply to Community harmonization 
measures taken under Article 100A. If no measures are taken, the rules con-
tained in the acquis communautaire remain in force. The objectives of Article SA 
are to be achieved using Article lOOA measures. As the objectives take the 
European Community beyond their current position, there is no damage done 
to the acquis communautaire, so the provisions do not take the European Com-
munity backwards in the substantive field of law. They do, however, deal a 
serious blow to the structure and uniformity of Community law. On the bright 
side one could view Article lOOA as a taming of the Luxembourg Compromise. 
A member state's invocation of "limited" vital interests is now being reviewed. 
Article 100B provides a "fail-safe" that is designed to fail under member state 
pressure. In 1992, an inventory of national laws still to be harmonized under 
Article lOOA is to be drawn up by the Commission in conjunction with the 
member states. The Council, acting under the Article lOOA(l) process, with 
Article lOOA(4) applying by analogy, may then decide that these remaining 
measures must be recognized as equivalent. There are several points worth 
noting. First, the article is not likely to be amenable to an Article 175 action, 
given its weak wording. Second, even if it were, member states would still have 
an option not to let any particular measures apply to them, as per Article 
lOOA(4). Third, the provision may prevent the use of the original Article 100 
in relation to matters covered by Article 100A, which might be considered a lex 
specialist in relation to this type of potential harmonization. Fourth, as a matter 
of substantive law, the only effects of Article lOOB will be to enforce mutual 
recognition. Although this may free the circulation of goods, it will not allow a 
true internal market to develop. Hypothetically, while the French may now not 
be able to prevent Italian pasta from entering France, since their standards 
would be recognized as equivalent, the market would still not be unified. The 
Community will not be able to achieve the uniformity between the different 
national markets necessary to reap economies of scale. This is particularly so in 
the currently trendy area of high technology, where standardized Euro-mea-
sures are vital for true world competitiveness.259 A plethora of competing stan-
dards in the Community will make the idea of a true internal market a mockery. 
In this respect, the European Community may be better off using some legis-
lation already passed.260 
25. The EP's draft Treaty on European Union allowed such non-application only subject to strict 
temporal limitations (Article 35). See CAPOTORTI, supra note 167, at 142. 
259 In this sense, the adoption of common telecommunications standards for direct satellite broad-
casting is a good step forward. 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 321 fina1)(1986). See a!.!o 0.]. 
EUR. COMM. (No. L 311) (1986). 
260 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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As mentioned above, the free movement of goods is also hindered by lack of 
tax coordination and resultant fiscal barriers. The SEA specifically excepts fiscal 
matters from the ambit of Article 100A qualifies majority voting and revises 
Article 99 to incorporate the cooperation procedure while still retaining the 
requirement of unanimity. It dictates that the Council shall take measures to 
harmonize excise duties and other indirect taxes within the 1992 time limit. 
The original version of Article 99 provided that decision-making in this field 
was "without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 100 and 101."261 Article 
101, although it has not been resorted to in this context, allows for a qualified 
majority vote to eliminate "distortion of conditions of competition" caused by 
difference in member states' laws, regulations, or administrative actions. The 
SEA apparently removes this possibility and thus could be said to be making 
fiscal harmonization more difficult. 262 
C. Other Policy Matters 
As noted above, the Community has established certain policies where there 
is a marginal attribution of jurisdictional competence, or, in some cases, no 
competence to act at the Community level. The SEA seeks to bring these 
activities within the fold of Community law proper. The likely success of these 
efforts in the fields of economic and monetary policy, regional policy, research 
and technical development policy, and environmental policy is assessed below. 
The substance of these policies is beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
remaining discussion places these SEA reforms in the context of the new deci-
sion-making processes. The effects that the inclusion of these policies are likely 
to have on the establishment of the internal market are also examined. 
1. Economic and Monetary Policy 
To achieve European Union, it is clear that further steps must be taken to 
unify monetary and economic policy. The free movement of capital263 has not 
yet been achieved.264 Economic and monetary union is still far away. The SEA's 
261 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 99. 
262 This has already caused great political difficulty. The current proposal to unify the VAT rate 
have been seised on by the Labour Party in Britain in an effort to embarrass the Conservative 
government. The unified VAT rate requires that VAT be levied on basic foodstuffs currently zero-
rated in both the U.K. and Ireland. See The Times (London), April 15, 1987, at p.l, col. 2. See generally 
D. PUCHALA, FISCAL HARMONISATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1984). 
26' See generally Oliver, Free Movement of Capital Between Member States, Article 67(1) EEC arui the 
Implementing Directives, 9 EUR. L. REv. 401 (1984). 
2 .. But note the repeal of the French exemption, 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 171) (1986). The SEA 
has added to Article 70 a provision that envisages "steps backward," hardly auspicious. Recently, the 
adoption of the Commission proposal, 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM No. 326 final) (1986), is a 
sign of hope. See generally 6 EUR. COMM. BULL. 16 (1986). 
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sole step in this area has been to formally recognize the European Monetary 
System (EMS).265 The original Treaty of Rome had weak provisions in regard 
to economic and monetary union. Progress in this area has been by political fiat 
of the European Council largely outside the formal treaty structure. The new 
Article 102A which directs the member states to use article 236 to implement 
any institutional changes is not a significant advance. The existing system266 will 
remain in effect and any alterations are to be confirmed only by political action 
at the highest level and with the agreement of the national Parliaments. 
2. Regional Policy 
A new Title V, entitled "Economic and Social Cohesion," has been added to 
Part III of the EEC Treaty. The aim here is to reduce disparities between the 
various regions. Article 130A makes the reduction of the backwardness of the 
least favored regions an object of Community policy. The objectives of Article 
130A and 130067 are taken into account by Article 130B in coordinating 
economic policy and in establishing the common policies and the internal mar-
ket. The structural funds268 are to be overhauled to rationalize their tasks and 
make them conform to the objectives contained in Articles 130A and 130C. 
Decisions relating to the Regional Development Fund are to be taken by qual-
ified majority in accordance with the new cooperation procedure.269 When these 
provisions are matched with the requirements set out in Articles 8C and 
IOOA,270 one can clearly see that Spain and Portugal were no idle bystanders 
during the negotiations on the SEA. The regional policy gains great political 
and legal weight through these reforms. Measures integrating the market can 
now legally be "bought" as regards those states most in need of regional aid. In 
a separate declaration, the Conference aspires to increase the money available 
to the Funds "within the limits of financing possibilities." Given the predicted 
exhaustion of community resources, this promise may amount to very little. 
3. Research and Technical Development Policy 
A Title VI dealing with research and development has also been added to 
Part II of the Treaty of Rome. The aim of the European Community in this 
265 See the last two paragraphs of the Preamble to the SEA and the new Article 102A. SEA, supra 
note 10. 
266 See generally P COFFEY, THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM-PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1984). 
See also P. LUDLOW, supra note 35. 
267 This gives a legal basis to and establishes the purpose of the Regional Development Fund. 
268 The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarentee Fund (EAGGF), the European Social Fund 
(ESF), and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). 
269 It is not clear why the RDF is singled out in this way. 
270 See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
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field is to "strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry 
and to encourage it to become more competitive at [the] international level."271 
This will be done through increasing research cooperation,272 the opening up 
of national public contracts, the definition of common standards, and the re-
moval of fiscal and legal barriers to intra-community cooperation by firms, 
research centers, and universities. The Community wishes to enable economic 
actors to exploit the internal market. The internal market is not only an internal 
product market based on mutual recognition of standards (equivalence test), 
but an internal market with common scientific-technical standards. The addition 
of these articles thus reinforces the importance of Articles 8A and 100A. 
Article 130G specifies the ways in which the Community can complement 
activities in member states to achieve these aims. Article 130H envisages coor-
dination of national policies and programs through the Commission, and au-
thorizes the Commission to initiate such coordination. This simply regularizes 
the situation that has in fact prevailed since at least 1974.273 
The financing provisions, however, are more novel. 274 Article 1301 provides 
that the Community shall adopt (by unanimity)275 a program setting out scientific 
and technological objectives by priority, with all costs fully calculated. This multi-
annual plan will yield specific subprograms,276 the fruits of which shall be 
disseminated as decided by the Council. Article 130L specifically foresees that 
not all member states need participate in these programs, and allows the pos-
sibility of some joint action by groups of member states with such programs 
being paid for by the member states concerned with the possibility of Com-
munity financing. 277 A two-speed Community in technical research is endorsed 
271 Article 130F(I). 
272 Article 130F(2). See also COMMISSION ApPROVAL OF JOINT VENTURES. Venit, The R&D Block 
Exemption Regulation, 10 EUR. L. REV. 151 (1985). The Council adopted a new framework program on 
September 28, 1987. See OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 302) (1987). 
273 A glance at any recent EUR. COMM. BULL. will show this to be the case. A plethora of research 
projects and initiatives are being supported by the Communities. E.g., The Esprit Initiative, 27 OJ. EUR. 
COMM. (No. L 67) (1984); The Race Programme, 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210)(1985); and the Brite 
Programme, 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 83) (1985). For background to this mire of acronyms, see 
generally Foighel & Gulmann, Industrial Policy, Research and Training Policy, Investment Policy, in COM-
MISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 477, 482ff (1983) and 
EUR. COMM. BULL. (1987) under headings Research and Development. 
274 Article 130P requires that detailed financing arrangements be established at the time of adoption 
of the programme. It envisages non-communautaire funds being used by alluding only to possible 
Community contributions and by leaving open the possibility of "other methods of Community fi-
nancing" outside the budget process. This is clearly a blow to the European Parliament, whose one 
undisputed major source of power relates to the budget process. 
275 SEA, supra note 10, at art. 130Q. 
276 SEA, supra note 10, at art. 130K. These are to be adopted by qualified majority after consulting 
the ECOSOC and in cooperation with the European Parliament. See also SEA, supra note 10, at art. 
130Q. 
277 Some projects such as Eureka already have non-Community participants. Esprit is a shared cost 
project. See lEuR. COMM. BULL. 20-21 (1986). 
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and the non-EEC financing envisaged reduces the extent of direct democratic 
control, through the European Parliament, on how research money is spent. 
The provisions of the SEA have provided the Commission with renewed en-
thusiasm in this sphere and it has wide ambitions.278 
Article 130M empowers the Community to participate directly in research. 
Article 1300 authorizes joint undertakings. These provisions simply regularize 
what has already de facto occurred under the auspices of the European Council's 
initiatives since 1974. Cooperation with third countries and international or-
ganizations must be by Treaty, not by contract.279 Given the current budgetary 
crisis and exhaustion of own resources, Community activities in this field may 
prove to be more limited than initially planned. 
4. Environmental Policy280 
Provisions relating to the environment are added by a new Title VII in Part 
III of the Treaty. Article 100A(3) requires that the Commission, when dealing 
with health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection, take a high 
level of protection as a base in proposing harmonization in this field. The 
Articles in this title apply for actions going beyond "approximation" of member 
states' laws. The European Community has in fact dealt with the question of 
the environment since 1972.281 Articles 130R-T repeat the principles set out in 
the action programmes. More importantly, Article 130R(2) inter alia provides 
that environmental protection requirements "shall be a component of the Com-
munity'S other policies."282 The European Community is not given a blanket 
attribution of competence, but is only allowed to act "to the extent to which the 
objectives ... can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the 
individual Member States."283 Moreover, member states are expressly required 
to finance and implement the non-Community measures. This limited attribu-
278 See 3 EUR. COMM. BULL. 7-10 (1986). The plan was initially dampened by Germano-British tight-
fisted ness. The EC plan for a 5 billion ECU budget was stoutly resisted by these two states both of 
whom considered 3 billion ECU to be sufficient. 
279 SEA, supra note 10, at art. 130N. The Commission proposes closer links with inter alia CERN 
and the European Space Agency. 5 EUR. COMM. BULL. 9 (1986). 
280 The European Commission was strongly in favor of more action with regards to environmental 
policy. See Commission Memoranda to the European Community Council, in 3 EUR. COMM. BULL. 97, at 101 
(1985). 
281 For a brief synopsis, see Murphy, Towards a More Fairly Balanced and Better Quality of Life. reprinted 
in THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW. at 487. 494. (1981). Fuller treatment can be found in COMMISSION 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. TEN YEARS OF A COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT POLICY (1984) and 
Kramer. The Single European Act and Environmental Protection: Reflections on Several New Provisions in 
Community Law. 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 659 (1987). 
282 This was insufficient to a critical European Parliament that demanded a "common policy" in this 
field. See 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 68)(1986). 
283 SEA. supra note 10. at art. 130R(4). 
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tion is further confirmed by Article 130R(5), dealing with cooperation with 
third countries and international organizations, especially its second paragraph 
which specifically reserves the member states' competence in this field. 284 Again, 
a new policy area is endorsed while retaining significant member state control. 
This is achieved directly through the limited attribution of competence, and 
indirectly by ensuring that the financing of the policies undertaken remain 
under member state control. 
Under Article 1305, the Council must act unanimously to decide in which 
areas the Community should take action. This framework is to layout in which 
fields decisions are in the future to be taken by a qualified majority. Article 
130T, however, gives most cause for concern. This article dictates that the 
adoption by the Community of protective measures shall not disallow member 
states' adoption of "more stringent protective measures compatible with this 
Treaty."285 The only saving grace here is that the most stringent measures must 
be compatible with the Treaty. The case law of the ECl on the restriction of 
free movement of goods does currently allow member states to restrict the 
movement of goods under the rule of reason if it should be "necessary" on 
environmental grounds. This provision then potentially stops true integration 
within the European Community and allows a multi-speed Europe to develop 
in relation to environmental protection. This can hardly be considered a great 
step forward, though the environment is now formally within a limited Com-
munity competence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The SEA consolidates many existing practices and makes them law. For 
example, the European Council is made a creature of the Treaties.286 European 
Unity is formally recognized as being the aim of the Community,287 therefore 
the regional policy is formally endorsed. In these matters the SEA consolidates 
what had become practice though not the strict letter of the law. It thus confirms 
the Community competence and/or practice in these areas. 
The SEA attempts, by innovations in the decision-making processes, to resolve 
some of the long-term problems that have bedeviled the Community. The 
general decision-making process is reformed in many instances but it is hardly 
made democratic. The new cooperation procedure is likely to slow down the 
legislative process without giving any "real powers" to the European Parliament. 
Moreover, Parliament's one true source of power, the financial input, is kept 
28. A separate Declaration of the Conference confirms however that the ERTA principles still apply. 
285 EEC Treaty, supra note I, at art. 130T. 
286 Article 130P, see supra note 274; see also Article 130R(4), supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
287 Though grudgingly, supra note 283 and accompanying text. 
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out of the Parliament's reach288 in the "new" areas of policy now within the 
domain of the Community legislator.289 
The decision-making process as regards trade barriers has been substantially 
altered by replacing the requirement of unanimity with a requirement for a 
qualified majority in the Council of Ministers. This is designed to break the 
logjam and enable the Community to speed through to a true "internal market." 
However, as pointed out,290 the results may be less than entirely satisfactory, as 
the aims of the Community are wider than having a mere "product" market 
(which Article 100B implies may be the result if the new decision-making process 
does not succeed). Moreover, in allowing member state derogation from Article 
100A harmonization ex post facto, the uniformity of Community law is threat-
ened. Even though the member state may have been able to achieve the same 
substantive law result prior to the passing of the SEA (by using the rule of 
reason escape route) the legal outcome then did not mean that the writ of 
Community law ran in some states but not in others. Whether the partial 
advance of Community harmonization is worth this price will depend on how 
stringent the Commission and ECl are in permitting derogation under Article 
100A(4). 
Other aspects of decision-making, for instance the Commission's law making 
role, are also formally endorsed. They are designed to help speed up the 
removal of nontariff barriers. However, the Council of Ministers has not yet 
adopted the proposed Advisory Committee method of delegation. If it does so, 
real progress may be forthcoming; otherwise one must conclude that the new 
approach to technical harmonization, adopted before the SEA, may prove more 
successful than the approach endorsed by the SEA itself. Moreover, the dele-
gation of implementation competence to the Commission could easily have been 
achieved without a reform of the Treaty. 
The SEA also seeks to advance the Community by conferring new jurisdiction 
in some areas (for example, labor-management relations,291 health and safety 
at work,292 research and technical development,293 and the environment).294 The 
288 See supra note III and accompanying text. 
289 A new Article 118B is added. See SEA, supra note 10. 
290 The effect of the SEA in this field is likely to be very marginal. Article 21 adds a new article 
liSA to the EEC Treaty. This permits legislation by the community in this field, using the new co-
operation procedure, to establish "minimum requirements," but allows member states to "take more 
stringent measures" if they so wish. 
291 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
29' This is especially so in the area of foreign policy coordination. 
294 Especially as interpreted by some of the member states. See, e.g., the Danish reservation noted 
by the Conference: 
The Danish Government notes that in cases where a member state is of the opinion that 
measures adopted under Article 100A do not ~afeguard higher requirements concerning the 
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SEA attempts to provide new political motivation in other areas, for example, 
by endorsing the Cockfield White Paper. It has certainly renewed the political 
legitimacy of the Commission's initiatives to establish a true internal market, 
and one can but hope that the Council of Ministers will adopt the ensuing 
proposals. The new advances are often "minimalist" and explicitly allow the 
member states to take more stringent measures. This hardly bodes well for a 
"genuine internal market." Moreover, it seems that the idea of differentiated 
progression is endorsed. Thus Articles 8C, 118A, 130L, and 130T as well as 
lOOA all allow for the differentiated application of Community law. 
The Single Act creates no Eurovessel into which to pour Europolitical power. 
Instead, the European Council is confirmed as the dominant initiator of policy, 
and the Council of Ministers as the prime decision-maker. Inter-governmental-
ism will stay,295 except possibly in the core area concerning the creation of the 
internal market. 
Overall, the Act must be welcomed, but with grave reservations as to the 
potentially disastrous effect of article lOOA. At worst, this could damage the 
careful case law of the ECl, built up over the years, to assure a uniform and 
supreme Community law. 
The SEA shows that European integration does not progress in a smooth 
wave, but rather in a series of steps forwards and backwards. An advance 
conceded in one area is matched by retreats elsewhere. It was an ambitious 
scheme to reform the Treaty while at the same time enlarging the Community. 
The time will never be entirely ripe for all member states to agree on the 
necessary changes. The advances made here reflect a renewed political will at 
least on the part of some of the states, but it could be cogently argued that a 
reform of the Treaty was not necessary to achieve the results manifested by the 
SEA. 
working environment. the protection of the environment or the needs referred to in Article 
36, the provisions of Article IOOA(4) guarantee that the member state in question can apply 
national provisions. Such national provisions are to be taken to fulfill the above mentioned 
aim and may not entail hidden protectionism. 
See supra note 10. 
295 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
